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Many forms of business conduct have been attacked as predatory since
the passage of the Sherman Act' in 1890. Neither the courts2 nor legal
and economic scholars,3 however, agree on a general definition of preda-
tory behavior.
Section I of this paper presents a definition of predation' that is eco-
nomically sound, judicially workable, and broadly applicable to a wide
variety of business practices. Section II shows how the well-known cost-
based tests for predatory pricing can be derived from this general stan-
dard. It also clarifies these cost-based tests, and expands their applicability
to encompass multi-product firms.
Sections III-V contain the most novel aspect of this paper-the deriva-
tion from our general standard of specific tests that distinguish between
predatory and procompetitive product innovations. These sections argue
that even genuine innovations-new products that in some ways are supe-
rior to existing products in the eyes of both engineers and consumers-are
in some circumstances anticompetitive. Such innovations do not provide
benefits to consumers that are worth the cost, and are motivated solely by
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1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). Predatory behavior also comes within the purview of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 12-17 (1976), the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1976), and the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976).
2. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 108-13 (1977) (reviewing early
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ACT: POLICY AND LAW VOLUME 1 (1980); Hurwitz, Kovacic, Sheehan & Lande, Current Legal Stan-
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with Yale Law Journal).
Predatory Product Innovation
the monopoly profit attendant on the exit that they induce.
Two types of product innovations are identified as potentially anticom-
petitive. The first involves the introduction of a new product that is a
substitute for the products of a rival firm, and that endangers the rival's
viability by diverting its sales. Although this tactic has not been exten-
sively scrutinized in antitrust litigation, it is related to a second type of
product innovation that has been the subject of an important and rapidly
growing line of cases. Firms adopting this second method of product inno-
vation, a form of "systems rivalry," introduce new systems of components
that are incompatible with components manufactured by rivals, and con-
strict the supply of components that are compatible with those made by
rivals. Sections III-V develop workable tests for determining whether or
not such tactics are predatory,' and show that these tests can deter anti-
competitive product innovation without distorting incentives for pro-
competitive innovation and without unduly taxing scarce judicial re-
sources. Finally, the Appendix employs the general standard of predatory
behavior to analyze the possible anticompetitive effects of product
"preannouncements."
I. A General Standard of Predatory Behavior
Assuming that businessmen know how their actions affect their profit-
ability and the profitability of their rivals,6 predatory objectives are pre-
sent if a practice would be unprofitable without the exit it causes, but
profitable with the exit. Thus, although a practice may cause a rival's
exit, it is predatory only if the practice would not be profitable without
the additional monopoly power resulting from the exit.
When a firm reduces price below cost, that firm exhibits a predatory
objective if it can recover the consequent losses of net revenue only by
exercising the additional monopoly power generated by a rival's induced
exit. Similarly, the introduction of a new product exhibits a predatory
objective if the firm can only recoup its investment by the exercise of such
additional monopoly power. It follows that predatory behavior is a re-
sponse to a rival that sacrifices part of the profit7 that could be earned
5. Our tests for predatory product innovation suggest the importance of two factors that have not
been analyzed in prior works on predatory behavior. First, the tests require scrutiny of the research
and development (R&D) investment in product innovations. Second, they imply that, in the context of
systems rivalry, the predatory act may be the upward repricing or withdrawal of preexisting compo-
nents that are complementary to the rivals' products.
6. See note 19 infra (relating to plausibility of this assumption); note 20 infra (discussing modifi-
cation of analysis to accommodate uncertainty).
7. Some commentators prefer not to focus on profit-sacrifice in testing for predation, but instead
focus on behavior that is detrimental to social welfare. See Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sher-
man Act: A Comment, 89 HARV. L. REV. 869, 883-84 (1976). Easterbrook characterizes the Scherer
approach as "nebulous," although he agrees that for a practice to be predatory it must reduce con-
9
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under competitive circumstances, were the rival to remain viable, in order
to induce exit' and gain consequent additional monopoly profit."
An important aspect of the proposed standard is the stipulation that the
sacrifice of profit must be assessed with reference to "competitive circum-
stances." Sacrifice should not be inferred if the incumbent avoids a cartel-
like response that yields greater profits both for him and for his rival.10
Instead, the profitability of the incumbent's actual and alternative re-
sponses should be assessed on the assumption that the rival reacts to them
in a competitive fashion. A cartel-like response would not benefit the in-
cumbent under this assumption because the rival's competitive reaction
would undermine its profitability. Therefore, the proposed standard does
not penalize the incumbent for legitimate competitive responses, even if
they damage the rival, and the standard does not protect a rival that can-
not prosper under competitive circumstances.
For a practice that induces a rival's exit to generate additional monop-
sumer welfare. See Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263,
264 n.6, 266 (1981). Scherer and Easterbrook disagree sharply, however, as to whether the fact-finder
in an antitrust case can perform the requisite welfare calculations. Cf. Joskow & Klevorick, supra
note 3, at 222, 282-87 (discussing problem of errors in enforcement of welfare-based tests for
predation).
8. The definition applies only to behavior that may cause existing rivals to exit the industry;
behavior that merely deters entry is beyond its scope.
9. The proposed definition of predation is similar in some respects to that proposed by other
authors. For example, Areeda and Turner state that
predation in any meaningful sense cannot exist unless there is a temporary sacrifice of net
revenues in the expectation of greater future gains. Indeed, the classically-feared case of preda-
tion has been the deliberate sacrifice of current profits for the purpose of driving rivals out of
the market and then recouping the losses through higher profits earned in the absence of
competition.
Areeda & Turner, supra note 3, at 698 (footnote omitted). This view of predation was embraced
explicitly by the court in Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 856 (9th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978). See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 144-45 (1978)
(predation "provisionally" defined as behavior not profit-maximizing unless rivals are driven from
market or chastened not to behave competitively); Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A
Policy for Prevention of Predatory Pricing, 89 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (1979) (arguing that if quasi-perma-
nence of price cuts is required, established firm will adjust its price in face of entry only if value of
resulting competitive gain exceeds long-run permanent reduction in price); Williamson, Predatory
Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284 (1977) (arguing that predation is inter-
temporal phenomenon entailing strategic response to actual or potential entry-response is only prof-
itable if it can be rescinded once entry threat subsides or entrant actually exits).
Our definition of predation is superior to the formulation offered by Areeda and Turner for several
reasons. First, it explicitly proposes a profit benchmark against which to measure the profit sacrifice.
See p. 13 infra. Second, if long-run profits are calculated on the premise of the continued viability of a
rival, the proposed definition suggests that predation may entail a sacrifice of long-run profits rather
than short-run profits. See note 21 infra. Third, it suggests that analysis of exit inducement should be
distinguished from analysis of behavior that deters entry without causing the exit of actual rivals; the
profit benchmark that is appropriate to test for predation against actual entrants may not be the
benchmark to test for entry deterrence.
10. Such a response might involve a curtailment of output by the incumbent firm to a level low
enough for the market to accommodate the entrant's output at a price that allows the entrant to make
a profit. An entrant cannot complain of predation, however, if his entry destroys the collusive disci-
pline of an industry and his profits are lower than he anticipated on the basis of industry history.
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oly power, and perhaps thereby to violate the proposed standard of preda-
tory behavior, a market must have several structural characteristics. First,
the market must be horizontally concentrated. In an unconcentrated mar-
ket, there is sufficient competitive discipline from the remaining rivals to
preclude monopoly power, irrespective of the exit of one firm.
Second, the market must be protected by a form of entry barriers that
we term entry hurdles. These hurdles exist whenever the prospective en-
trant is cost-disadvantaged relative to the incumbent solely because the
incumbent is already functioning as a going concern, and the entrant has
not yet committed the requisite resources." In general, entry hurdles arise
when investments are not fully reversible.1 2 The need to incur the irre-
versible portion of the investment, and thereby to put that amount at risk,
confronts the prospective entrant with a cost disadvantage relative to the
incumbent whose resources are already committed." Thus, an incumbent
may have an incentive to induce the exit of an entrant, who would then
11. Entry barriers that are not entry hurdles present a firm with a cost disadvantage vis-a-vis an
incumbent regardless of whether the firm is a prospective or an actual entrant. For example, a firm
with an inferior technology faces a cost disadvantage that would persist after its entry. Thus, it does
not matter to the incumbent whether rivalry from such a firm is active or prospective.
12. See Baumol & Willig, Fixed Costs, Sunk Costs, Entry Barriers, and the Sustainability of
Monopoly, 96 Q. J. ECON. 405 (1981) (discussing importance to market organization and perform-
ance of distinction between sunk costs and other fixed costs). Baumol and Willig show that the need
for an entrant to sink costs can be a barrier to entry that perniits incumbents to hold prices above
costs. In contrast, fixed costs that are not sunk costs do not impede the power of potential entry to
induce efficient operation and pricing on the part of incumbents. See W. BAUMOL, J. PANZAR & R.
WILLIG, CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (forthcoming); Bailey,
Contestability and the Design of Regulatory and Antitrust Policy, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 178, 178-79
(1981).
13. There are many types of entry hurdles due to the fact that many capital investments are
highly specialized, and their value in alternative uses is much lower than their value in the use for
which they were originally designed. For such investments, the liquidation value is well below the
original cost (adjusted for depreciation), and the difference is a source of risk for the potential entrant.
Before entry, the entrant must foresee an expected return that is sufficiently large to compensate
him for the risk of losing the irreversible portion of his investment. For the incumbent, in contrast, the
irreversible portion of his investment is already sunk, and the riskiness of his position is concomitantly
lower. In addition, the market may have been less risky to the incumbent when he entered because
there was less competition at that time. Consequently, the cost of capital to the prospective entrant
may be higher than it is for the incumbent. See, e.g., C. VON WEIZSACKER, BARRIERS TO ENTRY 123-
44 (1980); Williamson, supra note 9, at 295 n.36.
This type of entry hurdle is especially common if there are few prospective buyers in the resale
market for the entrant's capital stock, or if the entrant's capital is totally firm-specific and would have
no value to other firms. For example, advertising expenditures that are incurred in promoting an
entrant's product cannot be recouped if the product fails and the entrant exits the market. Similarly,
costs required to assemble a firm's labor force, to establish its reputation, and to acquire its technolog-
ical and market "know-how" are irreversible firm-specific investments. Costs required to construct a
firm's plant also may be irreversible if the plant cannot be resold intact.
Another type of irreversible investment may arise when an entrant has to acquire rights or licenses
in order to commence operation. Such acquisition costs will be sunk investments if their unexpired
portion is non-refundable. See United States v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 412
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (defendants argued that need to acquire costly, non-transferrable pay-television
movie rights created entry hurdles into pay-television network programming).
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face an entry hurdle afresh. If there are no entry hurdles, however, there
can be no incentives for predation because prospective entrants constrain
the market power of the incumbent just as effectively as actual
competitors.
A third structural characteristic that is necessary for successful preda-
tion is the presence of reentry barriers.'4 A reentry barrier may be defined
as the cost that a firm that has exited a market must incur to resume
production. If the firm can costlessly reassemble the physical and human
capital that was retooled or dispersed upon the firm's exit, then no reentry
barrier exists. Under such conditions, a firm confronted with predatory
behavior by a rival can shut down its operations, and costlessly reenter the
market when the predator attempts to recoup the profits that he sacrificed
during the predatory campaign. If reentry barriers are truly inconsequen-
tial, therefore, a predator cannot recoup lost profits because its rivals re-
main viable even after they cease production. Hence, there can be no mo-
tive for predation.'-
Other structural factors may also be relevant to the threshold assess-
ment of whether successful predation is feasible in a particular market.
For example, it is implausible that a relatively small firm could engage in
predation against a rival with a strong market position that could not be
rapidly eroded. Similarly, it is implausible that a firm with limited
financial resources could successfully engage in predation through price
cutting against a better-financed rival.
16
In a market characterized by the structural factors noted above, actual
and potential competitors are equally effective at constraining the market
power of incumbent firms-whatever the fate of the particular rivals
whose exit is at issue-and allegations of predatory behavior in that mar-
ket should be dismissed. The process of determining whether the market
has these characteristics is a structural test'7 that should be performed
14. If reentry is equivalent to de novo entry, then reentry barriers are the same as entry barriers,
including entry hurdles. In some instances, however, reentry may be less costly than new entry be-
cause some elements of tangible and intangible capital do not lose all value in the interval between
exit and reentry.
15. Bork's argument that successful predation is impossible, or unlikely, see R. BORK, THE ANTI.
TRUST PARADOX 149-154 (1978), depends to some extent on the unstated assumption that rivals of the
alleged predator do not face significant reentry barriers. Reentry barriers are fairly common and
significant, however, and exist to the extent that the capital formerly amassed by a firm has been
irreversibly dispersed or depreciated before reentry occurs. For example, salvaged and retooled equip-
ment, dispersed labor force and management, discontinued advertising, and unmaintained reputation
can only be replaced or readapted to their former uses at substantial cost. Such costs constitute reentry
barriers. See, e.g., G. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL (1964) (discussing depreciation of investments in
human capital and specific on-the-job training); M. PORTER, INTERBRAND CHOICE, STRATEGY AND
MARKET POWER (1976) (discussing advertising).
16. Predatory innovation, however, can entail a precommitment to sunk R&D costs that renders
financial staying power irrelevant.
17. In advocating a structural test, we agree with the two-tier approach suggested by Joskow &
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prior to the application of tests for predatory behavior. Concededly, one
rarely observes markets with no concentration, no entry hurdles, and no
reentry barriers, but structural tests nevertheless are useful. In general,
the benefit of predation to a firm is smaller the less concentrated its mar-
ket is (after the exit at issue occurs), the lower the entry hurdles are, and
the lower the reentry barriers are. Thus, the relevant structural test is
whether the conceivable gains from predation can outweigh the costs to
the incumbent of the allegedly predatory conduct. If not, there can be no
motive for predation and it is unnecessary to scrutinize allegedly preda-
tory conduct for anticompetitive effect or intent.
In markets in which structural factors permit successful predation, a
firm may rationally attempt to induce the exit of a rival in order to gain
additional monopoly profits. The mere fact of a rival's exit from such
markets, however, does not constitute sufficient proof of predation. To the
contrary, exit-inducing actions are not predatory if they are part of legiti-
mate competitive interactions. Differences between firms in efficiency vir-
tually guarantee that some firms will fail in a sufficiently competitive
marketplace. These inefficient firms can be induced to exit by actions that
efficient firms find profitable regardless of their effects on rivals' viability.
Such actions are not predatory.
This distinction between predatory and non-predatory exit-inducing be-
havior is captured by our proposed standard of predatory conduct. Under
that standard, predatory sacrifice of profit is assessed on the premise of the
continued viability of the rival. This potentially counterfactual premise
assumes that the rival remains able to produce without incurring new
start-up costs, whether or not the rival has actually ceased production.
Thus, the continued-viability premise is equivalent to assuming the ab-
sence of reentry barriers, 8 and a firm's action entails predatory sacrifice of
profit if there is some alternative action that would yield greater profit if
there were no reentry barriers. The existence of such an alternative action
indicates that the firm's actual action was motivated by the desire for the
monopoly profits attendant on the exit of the rival. 19
Table 1 illustrates these concepts. It lists the present discounted values
of the incumbent's profits for three scenarios: the actual action of the in-
cumbent that induces the exit of the rival; the actual action of the incum-
Klevorick, supra note 3, at 242.
18. But see pp. 41-42 infra (allowing for certain analytic complications that arise in the context of
systems rivalry).
19. It is unlikely that the alternative action is not known or immediately apparent to the alleged
predator. Indeed, in many contexts it is obvious what constitutes such an action. In the case of preda-
tory pricing, for example, an alternative action is a reduction of current output by the incumbent firm,
and a commensurate increase in price. In the case of sytems rivalry, the alternative action might be to
lower the price on the system components that are compatible with the products of the rival.
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bent under the counterfactual premise that the rival remains viable; and
the alternative action of the incumbent that allows the rival to remain
viable.
Firm A has an incentive to choose the exit-inducing "actual action,"
because it yields him a profit of 110, while the alternative yields only 105.
In this example, the incumbent's choice is predatory because under the
counter-factual premise that the rival remains viable, the actual action





Firm A Firm B
Actual Action Alternative Action Actual Action Alternative Action
Rival Viable 100 105 100 95
Rival Exits 110 110
Firm B's choice of the actual action is not predatory, however, even
though it induces exit. Again, the incumbent has an incentive to make this
choice, because it yields him a profit of 110, while the alternative action
yields only 95. Because the actual action yields a higher profit (100) than
the alternative action under the premise of the continued viability of the
rival, however, it entails no predatory sacrifice of profit."
Of course, the proposed standard would be difficult to administer if its
application required data like those presented in Table 1. Fortunately,
one can identify circumstances that are readily observable and that logi-
cally imply a predatory sacrifice of profit. Therefore, although the pro-
posed definition of predation is not itself a workable test, it provides a
unifying, general, and open-ended standard from which specific and
20. Uncertainty in the rival's response can be readily incorporated into the test for predation by
regarding the profit figures as expected values. See Ordover & Willig, supra note 4 (treatment of
predation under uncertainty).
21. Contrary to the analysis of other writers, see Areeda & Turner, supra note 3, at 698, 703, this
definition of predatory profit sacrifice does not necessarily imply that short-run profit is sacrificed for
future monopoly gain. For example, the actual action in Table 1 might earn current period profits of
10, while the alternative action earns only 5. Despite the fact that the actual action maximizes short-
run profit, however, it is predatory because it would not maximize overall profit if the rival remained
viable. Concededly, an effect of this kind is implausible in the context of predatory price-cutting, in
which the incumbent sets a low price designed to induce exit and thereby suffers an immediate loss of
net revenues. If the predatory action involves investments, however- for example, in plant capacity
or in R&D-the profit sacrifice may occur after the action is taken. In the context of systems rivalry,
for example, a predator may respond to entry by shifting from a relatively expensive R&D program
aimed at significant quality improvement of his products to a cheaper R&D program aimed at exclu-
sionary redesign of his products. Such an investment decision may raise short-run profit and raise
expected long-run profit (because of the additional monopoly power), but lower long-run profit under
the premise that the new rival remains viable.
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workable tests can be derived. In the case of single product firms, the
standard suggests a number of tests akin to those proposed by Areeda and
Turner.2" Similar tests can be derived for multiproduct firms.
II. Application of the General Standard to Predatory Price-Cutting
The well-known cost-based tests for predatory price-cutting, and useful
new variants of these tests, can be derived from the proposed standard.
A. Price Floors for Single Product Firms
Consider, as a stereotype, a dominant incumbent firm that drops its
price in response to entry, and thereby endangers the viability of the en-
trant. Our proposed standard of predatory behavior requires first that the
structure of the relevant market be examined for concentration, entry hur-
dles, and reentry barriers. If the market exhibits all of these structural
features, and if the price cut raises the probability of the entrant's exit to
a dangerous level, then the standard directs attention to the question of
whether the incumbent's response to entry, which includes his decisions
about price, output, capital investment, and marketing activities, entails a
predatory sacrifice of profit. If an alternative response would earn greater
profit for the incumbent under the premise of the continued viability of
the rival, a finding of predation would be appropriate.
In the simplest possible case, the issue of whether the incumbent's re-
sponse to entry entails predatory sacrifice of profit reduces to the issue of
whether an alternative response, less threatening to the entrant's viability,
would yield a higher level of current profit under competitive circum-
stances. This simple case arises when the response at issue has no impact
on the incumbent's future profits apart from effects on the degree of com-
petition offered by the rival. For this condition to hold, there must be no
intertemporal demand effects, such as those that motivate promotional
pricing, and current output and investment must have no effect on future
profitability. Such effects on future profits may sometimes exist, however,
and although the proposed standard can readily account for them, 23 we
22. Areeda & Turner, supra note 3.
23. For example, when an incumbent's response includes a change in his investment policy, an
effect on future profits will typically result. Workable tests that apply when the incumbent's response
includes investment or disinvestment in capital facilities can be derived from the general standard. See
Ordover & Willig, supra note 4, at 80. See also pp. 26-28 inra (discussing responses that include
R&D investment).
Areeda & Turner doubt whether such effects on future profitability can be incorporated into the
analysis in a practical manner. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 3, at 718-19. Concededly, neither
the legal and economic commentators nor the courts have heretofore developed a theoretical frame-
work with which to analyze such practices. Our framework can be adapted to this purpose, however,
and once it is so adapted, fact-finders will be able to determine whether it can be applied in a practi-
cal manner.
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assume for simplicity that under the continued-viability premise, the re-
sponse to the rival affects only the current profits of the incumbent. Then,
the actual response of the incumbent exhibits predatory sacrifice of profit
if an alternative price and output response would increase the incumbent's
current profits under competitive circumstances and would lower the
probability of the rival's exit.
When the response to entry involves price-cutting, the relevant alterna-
tive responses entail smaller levels of output than that actually chosen by
the incumbent, say by 8, and commensurately higher prices. Of course,
the price that would result under competitive circumstances from an out-
put reduction of 8 depends upon the precise nature of market demand and
rivals' production costs. Under the plausible assumption that an output
reduction does not result in a lower price, however, a cost-based test for
predatory profit sacrifice does not require a determination of the new
price level. Instead, observe that the incumbent's cutback of 8 from his
actual level of production would reduce his revenues by no more than his
original price, p, multiplied by the cutback, 6.4 If the incumbent's output
cutback would not affect price at all, the revenue reduction is exactly
equal to p6. If the cutback would cause the price to rise, the revenue
reduction would be less than p6 because of the additional revenue earned
on the remaining units of output.
The output cutback of 8 from the incumbent's actual production, which
is less damaging to the rival, will increase the incumbent's profits under
the continued viability premise if it yields him a savings of production
costs that exceeds the reduction of the incumbent's revenues. Thus, preda-
tory sacrifice of profit is present if the cost saving from the hypothetical
output cutback is larger than p&-an underestimate of the revenue reduc-
tion if price increases, and an exact estimate if price remains constant.
Concomitantly, predatory sacrifice is present if the incumbent's actual
price, p, is less than the average savings in costs due to the output cutback,
where the average is taken over the size of the hypothetical cutback, 8, for
any possible value of 8.21
Several specific values of 6 narrow this general test to especially useful
cost-based price floors. For the value of 8 that corresponds to elimination
of the incumbent's entire output, the test for predatory sacrifice is whether
the incumbent's price is below the average avoidable cost of the product
24. Let p' and p be the alternative and actual prices, respectively, and let q 0 - 6 and q0 be the
alternative and actual levels of output. Then, the reduction in revenues is pq0 .p,(qO.6). But, with p'
> p, this expression is less than or equal to pqo - p(qO -5) = p6, as stated in the text.
25. If 0(q 0 ) and C(qP-5) denote total production cost for output levels qO and q0 - 5, respec-
C(q') - C(qO-b)tively, predatory sacrifice is present if p "<
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line in question. For the value of 6 that corresponds to the smallest possi-
ble output cutback, the test is whether the price is below the marginal
(avoidable) cost.
2'
Thus, the cost-based tests for predatory pricing advanced by other writ-
ers may be derived from our proposed standard.27 But contrary to the sug-
gestion of Areeda and Turner that the average cost price floor is merely
an approximation to the theoretically superior marginal cost price floor,28
our standard implies that both average cost and marginal cost define cor-
rect price floors.2 9 In particular, if the incumbent's price is below marginal
cost, a slight reduction of the incumbent's output flow would raise profits
under the premise of the continued viability of the rival. If the price is
below average cost, an elimination of the incumbent's output flow would
raise his profits under the same premise. Because either of these alterna-
tives is less threatening to the rival's viability than the incumbent's actual
response, both define correct tests of predatory sacrifice under the pro-
posed standard. 0
Our approach to the derivation of these cost-based tests also clarifies the
appropriate cost concepts. Whatever the cost-based test at issue, it is the
cost saving from an output contraction that must be compared with the
associated revenue reduction. Hence, advertising and other marketing
costs, for example, should be included in the average cost test to the extent
that they can be avoided if the incumbent ceases production.
Similarly, there are circumstances in which capital costs should be in-
26. Other hypothetical cutbacks yield additional cost-based price floors that are germane to vari-
ous circumstances. For example, if the incumbent increases his output following the rival's entry, an
interesting and important hypothetical cutback is equal to the post-entry output expansion. The resul-
tant cost-based test for predatory sacrifice is whether the actual price is below the average cost of the
post-entry output expansion. See Ordover & Willig, supra note 4.
27. Cost-based tests for predatory pricing were first derived by Areeda & Turner, supra note 3,
and amplified by Baumol, supra note 5, and Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 3. Leading court cases
that have applied these tests include Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d
848 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978); International Air Indus., Inc. v. American
Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976); California Computer
Prods., Inc. v. IBM, 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979); Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM, 459 F.
Supp. 626 (N.D. Cal. 1978), 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 80-4048 (9th
Cir. Jan. 31, 1980); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal.
1978), aftd. sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. IBM, 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980). See also Pacific Eng'r
& Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977). A
useful and up-to-date compendium of predatory pricing cases is Hurwitz, supra note 2.
28. Areeda & Turner, supra note 3, at 716-18.
29. This result, of course, depends upon our stated assumption 'that relevant alternative responses
by the alleged predator have no effects on his future profitability, other than those that stem from the
exit of rivals. See pp. 15-16 supra.
30. The relative stringency of these two tests will depend upon the circumstances in which they
are applied. For example, if there are economies of scale in avoidable costs, then the average cost test
is the more stringent one-that is, it defines a higher price floor than the marginal cost test.
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cluded in the calculation of the cost-based price floors. 1 If capital has
alternative uses, either internal or external to the firm, output contractions
can save capital costs by freeing equipment for use elsewhere. These
avoidable capital costs should always be included in the calculation of
price floors. Moreover, even if capital costs are not avoidable after they
are first incurred, they should still be included in the price floor that ap-
plies when the firm has expanded output as part of its allegedly predatory
conduct-the firm could have avoided such costs by maintaining the origi-
nal level of output. Capital costs should be included to some extent under
these circumstances regardless of whether the firm expanded its capital
stock concurrently with its output expansion.32 Thus, although output ex-
pansion in response to entry is not necessarily predatory under the pro-
posed standard, output expansion can lead to a higher cost-based price
floor, and to a more stringent test for predatory price cutting.
33
Given the appropriate cost concepts, these tests for predatory pricing
protect and enhance competition without simultaneously interfering with
its workings. The tests condemn behavior that induces exit and that is not
a part of the normal competitive process, but they do not mistake a nor-
mal competitive response for a predatory response-competitive responses
entail no sacrifice of profit under the premise of the continued viability of
the rival.
Furthermore, one can demonstrate in a variety of theoretical settings
that the proposed standard protects rivals that would profitably produce in
the socially optimal allocation of production among extant firms, but does
not protect inefficient firms that would not profitably produce at the social
optimum. 4 Suppose, for example, that both the incumbent and the rival
have constant marginal and average costs. If the costs of the incumbent
are lower than those of the rival, then the latter would not profitably
produce in the socially optimal allocation of productive resources. Without
violating the standard of predation, therefore, the incumbent can induce
the rival's exit by lowering price to a level just below the rival's cost.
31. See Ordover & Willig, supra note 4, at 81.
32. If the firm expanded its capital stock concurrently with the output expansion, then an alterna-
tive and less damaging response to its rival would be to lower output and to lower or at least postpone
investment. Under these circumstances, the added capital costs are directly attributable to the actual
output expansion. If the output expansion is not accompanied by additional investment, then the price
floor calculation should still include any increase in the costs of producing the preexpansion level of
output caused by the congestion of capital facilities. A conservative estimate of this amount is the cost
of the capital that eventually would be purchased to alleviate such congestion.
33. See Williamson, supra note 5, at 114-16 (arguing that output expansion by incumbent firm
following entry of rival may be predatory).
34. Application of the proposed standard does not necessarily raise the level of social welfare if the
incumbent and his rivals do not actively compete. In fact, one can construct examples in which all
extant firms exhibit non-competitive behavior, and although the standard may protect an existing firm
from induced exit, such exit would raise social welfare.
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Because a higher price would be undercut by the rival, no alternative
price, less damaging to the rival, earns the incumbent greater current
profit under competitive circumstances. A price just below the rival's cost
entails no profit sacrifice, therefore, and it does not violate our standard of
predation even though it induces exit.
Now suppose that the costs of the incumbent exceed those of the rival.
Then only the rival would profitably produce at the social optimum. The
incumbent nonetheless may have an incentive to induce the exit of the
rival to gain market power and to permit prices in excess of the rival's
costs. If his staying power is greater than the rival's,35 it is possible that
the incumbent will successfully induce exit, and thus reduce social welfare
because, by hypothesis, the rival should produce at the social optimum.
An exit-inducing action by the incumbent under these conditions, how-
ever, entails predatory sacrifice, because a price below the rival's cost will
cause the incumbent to earn a negative profit that is less than his profit
under any one of the following alternative responses that are less damag-
ing to the rival: a small cutback in output; a total elimination of produc-
tion; or an increase in price to a level that covers production costs. Of
course, if the incumbent's actual action succeeds in driving the rival out of
the market, it may be the incumbent's most profitable action. Under the
premise of the continued viability of the rival, however, the actual price is
not the most profitable price, and it is predatory under the proposed
standard. 6
35. The incumbent may have greater staying power than the more efficient rival if he has better
internal financing or has more tangible assets available to secure debt. Concomitantly, external financ-
ing is not always available to the rival simply because he is more efficient. This fact does not necessa-
rily reflect imperfections in the operation of capital markets, but rather it may reflect the intrinsic
inability of outsiders to appraise the market situation with certainty, and their resulting unwillingness
to provide funds without charging a substantial risk premium.
36. To elaborate on the welfare analysis of the proposed standard, consider an industry in which
the socially optimal allocation of productive resources requires production by an arbitrary number of
firms, n, indexed by i = 1,2,..., n. At the social optimum, each firm charges the market price, p*,
produces q? where C!(qi), the firm's marginal production cost, is equal to p*, and earns a non-
negative profit given by 7r! i p*q" - C.(q!) i 0. To induce the exit of a rival who would produce at
this social optimum, it is necessary that a firm (say firm 1) set price at a level below p*, or set price atp* while producing more output than q*, thereby leaving the rival with smaller demand than it needs
to cover its costs. Otherwise, the rival, i, would earn at leastlr i > 0, and would continue to produce.
Either of these exit-inducing tactics, however, entails a predatory sacrifice of profit on the part of
firm 1. An alternative action for firm 1, less damaging to the rival, is to charge p* and produce q'.
The competitive response to this action by each other firm, j, is to produce q! and charge p*, so that
p* indeed will be the market price under competitive circumstances.
The price p* and the output q , earns a higher profit for firm 1, under competitive circumstances
and with the continued viability of the rival, than a price below p* or an output above q* at price p*:
Define 7r*(p) to be the maximium profit that firm I can earn if the market price is p. This maximum
corresponds to a choice of output q*(p) at which marginal cost, C'1[q*(p)], is equal to p. Therefore,
.= p q1- CI(q*) = "*(p*). Moreover, because T7r(p) decreases as p decreases, if firm 1 sets aprice that is lower than p*, or produces an output that is greater than q I at the price p*, it will earn
a profit smaller than ir*(p*), the profit it would earn at the social optimum. The exit-inducing tactics
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B. Price Floors for Multiproduct Firms
This section develops a test for predatory price-cutting that is applica-
ble to multiproduct firms." It shows how cost-based price floors should be
adjusted for demand interrelationships between products.
The analysis again focuses on the response by a dominant incumbent
firm to the entry of a new rival. The incumbent is assumed to be a mul-
tiproduct firm, however, and the product whose price or output level is
allegedly predatory is assumed to be cross-elastic with another of the in-
cumbent's products. The multiproduct nature of the firm does not alter
the basic test for predatory sacrifice-whether an output contraction of
size 6, along with a commensurate increase in price, would increase the
current profit of the incumbent under competitive circumstances.
As above, assume that the output contraction does not cause price to
fall, so that p6 is a conservative estimate of the loss of revenue from the
sales of the product, and the associated cost savings less p6 is an overesti-
mate of the increase in the incumbent's current profit on the product. In
the multiproduct case, however, the effects of the output contraction on
the incumbent's profit also depend upon its effects on revenue and produc-
tion costs for the cross-elastic product. Let w be the initial price of the
cross-elastic good before the output contraction, and let Ay be the change
in sales of the cross-elastic good due to the output contraction, 6. An esti-
mate of the effect of the output contraction on profit from sales of the
cross-elastic good that leads to a conservative test for profit sacrifice is the
approximate change in revenue, wAy, less the change in production cost
for the cross-elastic good attributable to the change in its output. 8
Predation exists under our standard if the conservative estimate of the
loss of direct revenues from the hypothetical output contraction, p6, is less
than the sum of the direct cost saving from the contraction and the esti-
mate of the net effect on profit from the sales of the cross-elastic product.
of setting price below p* or producing output greater than q] at price p*, therefore, earn less profit
under competitive circumstances and with the continued viability of the rival than the alternative of
producing q1 at price p*. Hence, the use of exit-inducing tactics against a firm that would produce at
the social optimum entails predatory sacrifice of profit under the proposed standard of predation.
On the other hand, a firm can induce the exit of another firm that would not produce at the social
optimum without predatory sacrifice of profit. In this model, such a result can be derived by analyzing
a series of price reductions and output increases culminating in the attainment of the optimum. Under
competitive circumstances, these actions by firms that would survive at the optimum increase their
profits, and hence do not entail predatory sacrifice.
37. The courts have had difficulty with this problem. See Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM,
459 F. Supp. 626, 631-32 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (suggesting that adjustments to cost-based tests to reflect
cross-elasticity are impermissible as a matter of law).
38. Considering w to be unchanged leads to a conservative test for sacrifice because if the output
contraction of 5 increases profit (under the viability premise) with w unchanged, then it would also
increase profit with w readjusted to maximize profit concurrently with the output contraction. Cf P.
SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1947) (discussion of Le Chatelier principle).
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Equivalently, the test for predatory sacrifice is whether the price at issue
is below the cost saving from the hypothetical cutback, averaged over the
size of the cutback, plus an adjustment for the cross-elastic effects. This
adjustment is the ratio of the induced output change, Ay, to the cutback, 6,
multiplied by the margin between the price, w, and the average cost
change associated with the cross-elastic good. 9
To analyze the effects of this adjustment on the cost-based price floors
for multiproduct firms, relative to the floors that would be used for single
product firms, assume that the price of the cross-elastic good is not less
than its average incremental cost."0 If the cross-elastic product is a substi-
tute4 for the good in question, the adjustment for cross-elasticity raises the
cost-based price floor because price cuts have an additional negative effect
on the incumbent's current profits due to the diversion of profitable sales
from the substitute product. If the cross-elastic product is a complement to
the good in question, however, the adjustment lowers the price floor be-
cause price cuts have an additional positive effect on the incumbent's cur-
rent profits by stimulating profitable sales of the complementary product.
In both cases, the size of the adjustment to the price floor is greater, the
larger is the mark-up of price over cost on the cross-elastic good, and the
more sensitive are the sales of the cross-elastic good to the price and out-
put of the good in question. If there is no significant cross-elastic effect, or
if there is no significant mark-up over average incremental costs on the
cross-elastic good, the adjustment for cross-elastic effects may be ignored.'
39. To be precise, let q' and yO be the actual output levels of the two goods. An output contraction
of 5 would increase the incumbent's current profit if p'(q* -6) + w(y*+Ay) - C(q' - 8, y' +Ay) >
pq0+wy-C(q', y'), where C now denotes the multiproduct cost function. With p' > p, a sufficient
condition for this inequality to hold is:
p < C(q,y°)'C(q'Sy*) + -y [ w_ C(qo-Sy*+Ay)'C(q'A 8 ,yO)
40. This assumption is likely to be correct because the price of the cross-elastic good is not being
tested for predation -absent predatory intent, it would not pay the incumbent to maintain that price
below average incremental cost.
41. Two goods are "substitutes" if an increase in the price of one good increases the demand for
the other. For example, mid-size Chevrolets and mid-size Buicks are likely to be substitutes. Two
goods are "complements" if an increase in the price of one good decreases the demand for the other.
Computer peripherals and central processing units are likely to be complements, as are cameras and
film.
The degree of substitutability or complementarity between two goods is measured by their cross-
elasticity of demand, which equals the percentage change in the quantity demanded of one commodity
that results from a one-percent change in the price of the other commodity. If the cross-elasticity is
positive, then the two goods are substitutes; if it is negative, then the two good are complements.
42. It is not correct, however, to base the tests of price predation for a multiproduct firm on a
product-specific average cost. For a multiproduct firm, average cost is not a meaningful concept, be-
cause its calculation implicitly requires that fixed costs, including some R&D costs, be allocated
among product lines. There are no economically sound methods for allocating such common costs,
however, and as shown above, see note 29 supra, average incremental cost is the appropriate measure
of a product's cost for purposes of predation analysis. See In Re Coal Rate Guidelines-Nationwide
Proceedings before the ICC, Ex Parte No. 347 (Sub-No. 1) (May 11, 1981)(statement of W. Baumol
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III. Predatory Product Innovations
Predatory pricing is only one of the strategies that a firm may use to
induce the exit of a competitor. The introduction of a new product can
also be anticompetitive and predatory. Indeed, such a tactic may be more
effective than predatory price-cutting as a way of inducing exit.'
3 Of
course, the introduction of a new product can also be procompetitive, as
well as directly beneficial to consumers who prefer the new product to the
existing ones.
Unlike a price cut, however, the introduction of a new product is a
composite strategy. It involves at a minimum the following fundamental
decisions: (a) the choice of the product design; (b) the choice of the time to
announce the new product; (c) the choice of the price for the new product;
(d) the choice of the size and content of research and development (R &
D) and promotional budgets; and (e) in a multiproduct firm, the choice of
the associated adjustments in the prices of existing products. Each of these
choices can affect the viability of competitors. To test the introduction of a
new product for predation, therefore, it is necessary to scrutinize these
choices both singly and jointly as components of the overall strategy."
Our analysis considers two tactics that may or may not be predatory.
One tactic is the introduction of a new product that is a substitute for the
products of the rival firm, and that endangers the rival's viability by di-
verting its sales. The second tactic, employed in the context of systems
rivalry, involves the constriction of the supply of components that consum-
ers must purchase in order to use the product of the rival, and a concur-
& R. Willig, economists); Braeutigam, An Analysis of Fully Distributed Cost Pricing in Regulated
Industries, 11 BELL J. ECON. 182 (1980); Cole, A Note on Fully Distributed Cost Prices, 12 BELL J.
ECON. 329 (1981). But see Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM, 459 F. Supp. 626, 631 (arguing that
appropriate method of cost allocation is factual question).
43. Product innovation may be more effective than price-cutting in inducing the exit of a rival
because the associated costs to the firm are largely fixed and irreversible. After a firm commits the
requisite R&D and other fixed costs, the remaining reversible costs of the product introduction may
be so small that the firm would not abandon its tactic whatever the rival's response. Aware of this
fact, rivals may quickly exit. In contrast, a rival's dogged refusal to exit can always motivate a firm to
rescind a price cut. Thus, rivals may persevere in order to test the resolve of the price-cutter.
Areeda and Turner argue against extensive antitrust scrutiny of investments in new products or
product lines. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 3, at 719, 722, 730. Even in the absence of antitrust
sanctions, however, manipulation of the product set can be more effective than price-cutting as an
anticompetitive tactic. There is a strong policy reason not to exclude the introduction of new products
from antitrust scrutiny, therefore, unless reasonable tests for predation are infeasible.
44. Under the Areeda-Turner test, a new product is not predatory if its price satisfies the de
minimis requirement that it equal or exceed the short-run marginal cost (or, if marginal costs cannot
be computed, the short-run average variable cost). Short-run marginal cost and short-run variable
cost, however, are not correct cost-based price floors for new products. To illustrate, consider a new
product whose demand in the presence of competition permits a price above these floors, but does not
permit a price high enough to recoup the requisite R&D outlays. The social benefits from such an
R&D investment are questionable. See pp. 26-28 infra. In addition, a firm may undertake such an
R&D investment in order to induce the exit of rivals, increase its monopoly power, and thereby
recoup R&D outlays through price increases made possible by the weakening of competition.
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rent introduction of new systems components that provide consumers with
an alternative to the rival's- products.
Each of these tactics can have three effects. First, each may increase the
variety or the quality of the products available to consumers. Second, each
may facilitate the procompetitive entry of new firms, or the procompetitive
expansion of the number bf competing products. Third, however, each
may undermine competition by eliminating rivals whose viability is essen-
tial to competition.
A. The Introduction of Substitute Products as a Form of Predation
This section discusses in detail the phenomenon of competition through
the introduction of substitute products. Although the introduction of sub-
stitutes has not been a subject of extensive antitrust scrutiny, the tests for
predatory innovation developed in this section are necessary to the devel-
opment of tests for predatory systems rivalry, which has been the subject
of extensive litigation.
1. Introduction to Theoretical and Practical Issues
The prototypical instance of predation through the introduction of a
substitute product may be described as follows. The dominant manufac-
turer of widgets in a concentrated industry introduces a new and superior
model. The price of the new model is set low enough to induce a large
percentage of buyers to switch from previous models, among which there
is significant competition. Because of declining sales and declining net rev-
enues, rival manufacturers abandon the production of widgets, and dis-
perse their productive assets. After exit occurs, the innovating firm
readjusts its prices and earns additional monopoly profits that are pro-
tected by entry hurdles and reentry barriers.
It is not surprising that predatory product innovation may occur in a
scenario of this kind. If a dominant firm can engage in predatory price-
cutting, with the quality of its product left unchanged, an obvious alterna-
tive tactic is to improve the product's quality without changing its price.
Because consumers may divert their purchases of the rival's goods to the
new product in response to the quality improvement, the qualitative effect
on a rival of predatory product innovation is much the same as the quali-
tative effect of predatory price-cutting.
An important conceptual distinction between the two tactics, however,
is that although predatory price-cutting may reduce price below cost,
predatory product innovation may increase cost above price. Such a cost
increase may consist of an increase in variable cost, an increase in expen-
diture for R&D and other fixed costs necessary to bring the new product
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to market, or both. It is the second group of costs that raise practical and
theoretical issues beyond the issues already discussed in connection with
predatory pricing. The proposed general standard of predation, however,
does suggest a proper test for predatory product introduction that incorpo-
rates such costs. Essentially, the test inquires whether R&D and other
fixed outlays that are incurred for the new product can be recouped
through profits on 'the new product, under the premise of the continued
viability of the rival. Of course, an important problem in the application
of this test is to distinguish between predatory R & D expenditures, and
R & D expenditures for unsuccessful projects that are undertaken for le-
gitimate purposes. These practical aspects of implementing the test are
discussed in Section III. C below, after a demonstration of the welfare
optimality of the test in the context of a simple model.
2. A Model of Predation through Substitute Product Innovation and its
Welfare Implications
Consider the following scenario: Immediately after the entry of a rival,
the dominant firm (firm A) sells NA units of output, and the rival firm
(firm B) sells NB units of a product that substitutes perfectly in the per-
ceptions of consumers for the output of firm A. Each firm receives a price
of p per unit, and each consumer values4" a unit of either firm's product at
b. The unit production cost for firm A is cA, which is less than or equal to
the unit production cost for firm B, cB. The rival, firm B, equates price
and unit cost so that cB- =p.
Suppose that in response to the entry of firm B, firm A expends the
sum of R on an annual basis" to introduce a new substitute product. The
new product yields to each consumer a value of b" per unit, and has a
variable unit production cost of c'A. Firm A markets the new product at
the highest possible price that induces all consumers to purchase the new
product instead of the old product. This price, p', is just below b'-b+p
because, at this level, the net benefit to a consumer from purchasing the
new good, b'-p', just exceeds the net benefit from purchasing the old good,
b-p.47 As a result, firm B loses all of its sales and exits from the market.
Afterwards, in the presence of reentry barriers, firm A can raise its price
without concern for the competition of firm B, and can thereby earn
45. The "value" of one unit of a product to a consumer is equal to the maximum amount the
consumer will pay for it.
46. That is, the actual R&D expenses of firm A are equivalent in present value to annual ex-
penses of R over the anticipated life of the new product. Thus, R can be viewed as the present value
of R&D expenditures multiplied by the sum of the rate of return and the appropriate depredation
rate.
47. That is, if p°<(b'-b+p), then b'-p'>b'-(b'-b+p) = b-p.
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greater profit.
Under the proposed general standard of predation, the introduction of
the new product is not predatory if the investment required to introduce
the product is recoverable under the premise of the continued viability of
firm B. Under that premise, B continues to make its product available at
the competitive price of p, and firm A can obtain a price no higher than p'
= b'-b+p for the new good. Then, under the continued viability premise,
one can show that the annualized investment cost of R is exceeded by the
increase in firm A's net revenues from the new product if and only if the
investment is socially desirable. That is, the social benefits from the new
product exceed its costs if and only if the introduction of the product is
profitable under the premise of the continued viability of the rival.48 Thus
the proposed test for predation is indeed conducive to social welfare.
Of course, our demonstration of the welfare optimality of the proposed
predation standard rests on the assumptions of this simple model. Never-
theless, the analysis has a number of general implications. First, even if a
new product is successful in the market, it may either increase or decrease
social welfare, depending upon the magnitude of R&D costs and other
investments. Second, a dominant firm may profit from the introduction of
a new product, whether or not it is socially beneficial, if it induces the exit
of a rival and thereby increases the firm's monopoly power. Third, appli-
cation of the proposed standard of predation may reduce the incentives for
anticompetitive product innovation, without diminishing the incentives for
procompetitive innovations.
3. General Application of the Proposed Standard
General application of the proposed standard to the introduction of sub-
stitute products raises a number of issues that require further discussion.
Under the continued viability premise, the assessment of the profitability
of a new product must take account of the loss in net revenues from the
innovator's old product. In other words, the introduction of a new substi-
tute product may be predatory if the revenues from its sales fail to exceed
the incremental costs of its production plus the reduction in net revenues
48. The algebraic proof is as follows: Prior to the introduction of the new product and the invest-
ment in its development, firm A earns a profit of 7ro=NA(P-cA). After the new product is introduced,
and under the continued viability premise, the new price is p'-b'-b+p. Firm A displaces the sales of
firm B, and hence firm A's new profit level under the continued viability premise is 7r,-(NA+N B)
(b'-b+p-C'A)-R. If the innovation is to be profitable under the continued viability premise, then 7r,-
ir#>O. This inequality implies that NA(b'-b+cA-c'A)+NB(b*-b+p-e'A)-R>0. Recall that p=cB.
Then, this inequality can be written as NA[(b-c'A)-(b-AY] + NBI(b°-c'A)-(b-cB)]-R>O. The ex-
pression on the left-hand side, however, is precisely the change in net social welfare due to the invest-
ment and new product introduction, as measured by the sum of consumers' and producers' surplus.
Thus,r,- 0>0 holds if and only if the investment and innovation increase social welfare.
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caused by the diversion of sales from the preexisting products of the inno-
vator. If revenues fall short of this level, there is prima facie evidence that
the product introduction entails a predatory sacrifice of profit under the
continued viability premise.4"
The existence of a profit sacrifice, however, is not itself sufficient for a
finding of predation. The likelihood of the rival's exit must be substan-
tially raised by the product introduction, and the additional monopoly
profit that would accrue to the innovator after the exit of the rival must be
sufficient to make the introduction of the new product profitable for the
innovator. This element of the test for predatory product innovation re-
quires the existence of a motive for predation. Clearly, there can be no
motive for predation absent the structural conditions of horizontal concen-
tration, entry hurdles, and reentry barriers. In addition, a finding that
R&D costs exceed the increment in net revenues earned under the viabil-
ity premise does not establish a motive for predation if these costs also
exceed the increment in net revenues with the rival's exit. Such a finding
establishes only that the innovating firm overestimated the benefits it
would obtain from its R&D investment.
As this last observation suggests, both the character and the details of
the proposed test depend to a large extent on the significance of post-entry
R&D costs. If these costs are small relative to the other incremental costs
of the new product, then the test for predatory price reduction by a mul-
tiproduct firm is directly applicable." If post-entry R&D expenditures are
49. This issue arose in Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM, 459 F. Supp. 626 (1978). The
plaintiff (TCC) asked the court to consider the effects of a new product introduction on the profitabil-
ity of preexisting product lines in calculating the cost-based price floor for ascertaining profit sacrifice.
TCC urged that "impact cost," measured as "the reduction in anticipated future profits on an existing
product line caused by the introduction of a new product line," should be subtracted from the new
product's profit in "determining whether the price set was predatory and below cost." Id. at 630. The
inclusion of impact costs was ruled to be impermissible as a matter of law on the ground that such
inclusion would constitute a drawback to research and innovation and that impact costs are difficult to
calculate. Id. at 631.
This ruling is at variance with the economic analysis of tests for predatory profit sacrifice presented
in this article. We argue that the introduction of a new product (or a price reduction on an existing
product) can divert sales from preexisting products. The forgone profits from diverted sales should be
netted out from the expected gross revenues that accrue to the firm from the introduction of a new
product, or, equivalently, should be added to the incremental costs incurred for the product introduc-
tion. Absent an anticompetitive objective, a firm would not engage in the development and marketing
of a new product if the new product were not expected to generate revenues sufficient to recoup its
operating and fixed costs, including R&D and marketing costs, and also to compensate the innovator
for profits lost through sales diversion. As Judge Schnacke observed at trial, IBM had engaged in a
very thorough financial analysis of the expected profitability of each of its new products. Transamer-
ica Computer Co. v. IBM, 481 F. Supp. 965, 997-1002 (1979). Consequently, assessments of the
impact costs were feasible. More importantly, however, impact costs would have been an important
component of an economically sound test for predatory product innovations in the Transamerica liti-
gation. The ruling to exclude such costs was inconsistent with our view that exit-inducing profit
sacrifice for the sake of future monopoly gain is predatory.
50. See pp. 20-21 supra.
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significant, however, then the decision to undertake the R&D investment
must be tested for predation along with the innovator's pricing strategy.
When R&D costs are at issue, the purpose of the test is to determine
the objective underlying the R&D investment decision. This determination
requires scrutiny of the level of profits with and without the viability of
the entrant and net of the post-entry R&D costs that are allocable to the
innovation and were foreseeable at the time the investment was made.
As a defense to a charge of predation, the defendant may show that his
inability to recover the full incremental cost of the newly introduced prod-
uct, including the post-entry R&D costs, stems from an exaggerated ex-
pectation of consumers' demand for the new product." A possible element
of proof in this argument is a showing that the defendant attempted to
recoup the initial outlay on R&D. A high initial price, followed by price
reductions to bolster sales, is indicative of such an attempt if supported by
the appropriate marketing evidence.
The defendant's investment planning process may be the most useful
source of data concerning the firm's expectations. Decisions to commit
substantial funds to R&D projects are likely to be supported by internal
analyses of prospective costs and financial benefits.5 2 These analyses often
identify the objectives of an R&D project, such as bringing a preconceived
product to market, or generating basic research whose market applicabil-
ity is as yet unknown. Because the costs of basic research cannot be attrib-
uted to specific products, such costs should be excluded from the tests for
predatory sacrifice of profit. On the other hand, R&D expeditures for
preconceived products are relevant to the proposed tests of predatory
sacrifice.
Of course, R&D projects are endemically subject to uncertainty both
with regard to the cost necessary to achieve a given outcome, and the usa-
ble output achieved from a given outlay. This uncertainty exists for the
firm at the time of its investment decision, as well as for factfinders seek-
ing to determine the objective of that decision. The firm's objective is
properly assessed in terms of the costs and benefits expected by the
firm-which inform the firm's investment decision and which are reflected
in the firm's internal analyses.
Once the relevant R&D expenditures are isolated, the proposed stan-
51. Of course, if the new product is truly unwanted by consumers, it is unlikely to cause the exit
of a rival who produces a substitute product, and it is unlikely, therefore, that a charge of predatory
innovation would ever be brought. Even an unsuccessful product, however, should be required to pass
cost-based price tests that exclude considerations of post-entry R&D costs; the mere fact that the
product sells poorly should not preclude a charge of predatory conduct.
52. For example, the record in Berkey is replete with information about Kodak's R&D invest-
ment decisions. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 276-79 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
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dard requires identification of the market conditions under which the in-
novator expects to recoup those expenditures. Market conditions play a
central role in a firm's assessment of the expected benefits to be derived
from R&D. This assessment reflects the price that consumers are expected
to be willing to pay for a new product, and the quantity that they are
expected to purchase at a given price. These expectations must be based
on knowledge of the array of substitute products available in the market
and their prices. If an innovator's R&D decision is actually based on an
assessment of expected benefits that posits the continuing availability of
rivals' products, then that decision is free of predatory sacrifice.
4. The Dangers of "Off-the-Shelf" Product Innovations
As shown above, whether a new product passes the proposed test for
predation can depend significantly on the extent to which R&D costs are
included in the cost-based price floor. The proper allocation of these costs,
however, depends upon when the allegedly predatory innovation was un-
dertaken. If a new product is developed before entry occurs, and is intro-
duced "off-the-shelf" after entry occurs, then the R&D costs for the prod-
uct were sunk prior to entry and should not be included in the cost-based
floor. Otherwise, innovators would be accused of predation against rivals
who did not exist at the time of the allegedly predatory conduct.
Concededly, this treatment of R&D costs may give an innovator incen-
tives to accumulate new product designs in anticipation of entry,"3 and
then to wait and introduce the designs after entry occurs. The magnitude
of such incentives is generally small, however, because it is costly to
withold product innovations from the market in anticipation of uncertain
entry. First, the innovator must forego revenue from the sale of the new
products until the time of entry. Second, the innovator must forego the
return that would have been earned by investing the R&D funds else-
where. Third, there is a risk that actual or potential rivals may bring new
products to market before the innovator, and thereby render the innova-
tor's new product less profitable than it would have been if introduced
earlier. I
Moreover, innovating firms may have countervailing incentives to intro-
duce products early to create artificial entry barriers. 4 If incumbents fill
the spectrum of products that match the diverse tastes of consumers, pro-
spective entrants may find it difficult to create a new product that would
53. See Gilbert, Patents and Entry Deterrence, in STRATEGY, PREDATION, AND ANTITRUST ANAL-
YSiS (S. Salop ed. 1981) (discussing entry deterrence through accumulation of unused product
designs).
54. See Schmalensee, Entry Deterrence in the Ready-To-Eat Breakfast Cereal Industry, 9 BELL
J. ECON. 305 (1978) (arguing that brand proliferation, product differentiation, and intensive advertis-
ing create barriers to entry).
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make entry profitable. Thus, according to the entry-deterrence theory of
product competition, incumbent firms may offer an excessive, socially inef-
ficient variety of products to prevent the entry of new rivals.5 In view of
this countervailing incentive, and in view of the other costs of witholding
innovations from the market, the incentives for over-accumulation of prod-
uct designs are probably small.
To further reduce these incentives, plaintiffs might be permitted to in-
troduce evidence of off-the-shelf innovation as proof of predation. The
plaintiff might argue that the exit-inducing aspect of the product introduc-
tion made the introduction profitable, even though it was unprofitable
prior to the plaintiff's entry. If so, the product introduction entailed a
sacrifice of profit under the continued viability premise.
Despite the strength of this argument, however, off-the-shelf product
introductions in response to entry are not necessarily predatory. The
change in market structure due to entry can have a number of effects on
the profitability of a product introduction. For instance, the introduction
may be more profitable post-entry than pre-entry because with more
products in the market, the new product diverts fewer sales from the inno-
vator's own substitute products. In some instances, therefore, off-the-shelf
product introductions may be part of socially desirable product competi-
tion. Consequently, it would be socially counterproductive to place undue
weight on the fact that a product introduction is taken off-the-shelf.
Rather, off-the-shelf innovation should be treated like other innovation.
The R&D costs to be tested for predation should be limited to those in-
curred after the innovator became aware of the rival's actual or impending
entry. The plaintiff may utilize the fact that the innovator found the prod-
uct introduction unprofitable prior to entry, however, to bolster the show-
ing of predatory profit sacrifice.
5. Summary
Because technological progress is desirable and should not be stifled by
the antitrust laws, it may be tempting to follow the view that if engineer-
ing data suggest that a new product is superior to the product it replaces,
antitrust inquiry should end.16 Such products, however, do not always
generate higher social welfare. 7 Under the proposed standard, the rele-
55. Entry-deterrence theory and its relevance to antitrust policy is criticized in Easterbrook, supra
note 7, at 282-97. But see Williamson, Antitrust Enforcement: Where It's Been; Where It's Going
(University of Pennsylvania Working Paper, May 1981) (on file with Yale Law Journa) (concluding
that entry deterrence theory is useful to antitrust analysis).
56. See ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 458 F. Supp. 423, 439 (N.D. Cal. 1978), afl'd
sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. IBM, 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980).
57. We have argued that a profitable new product may not be socially beneficial if its R&D costs
can be defrayed only by the additional monopoly profit attendant on the exit of rivals. Other authors
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vant question is whether the innovator anticipated positive incremental
profit for the new product, given the continued viability of the rival. The
incremental profit measure should be calculated net of the losses resulting
from diversions of sales from the innovator's preexisting products, and net
of all post-entry R&D costs. If the post-entry R&D costs are small be-
cause the new product was introduced "off-the-shelf," the plaintiff may
attempt to show anticompetitive conduct from the fact that the off-the-
shelf design was introduced only in response to entry.
B. Predatory Systems Rivalry
Most of the recent cases pertaining to predatory product innovations
deal with the phenomenon of systems rivalry."8 Typically, the defendant
was a firm that had been offering systems components that were compati-
ble with the components produced by a rival, as well as systems compo-
nents that were competitive with the components produced by the rival.
The defendant then introduced a new system of components that were
incompatible with those of the rival, thereby threatening the rival's
viability.
To illustrate, consider a market for widget systems in which consumers
derive utility from appropriate combinations of widgets and widget acces-
sories. The dominant manufacturer of widgets, firm A, also manufactures
widget accessories, as does a rival firm, firm B. At some point in time,
however, firm A introduces a new line of widgets and compatible accesso-
ries that threatens the viability of firm B because the new widgets are
incompatible with firm B's accessories. If firm A's new widget system is
sufficiently superior to the old widget system in the perceptions of con-
sumers, firm B may be driven out of the widget systems market even if the
price of the old systems remains the same. Firm A can increase the likeli-
hood of firm B's exit, however, by increasing the price of the old-style
widgets or by discontinuing their production.
This section provides workable tests to determine whether the introduc-
have shown that a profitable new product may lower social welfare if it diverts demand from substi-
tute products that are produced with significant economies of scale. See, e.g., E. CHAMBERLIN, THE
THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (6th ed. 1948); R. WILLIG, WELFARE ANALYSIS OF POLI-
CIES AFFECTING PRICES AND PRODUCTS (1979); Dixit & Stiglitz, Monopolistic Competition and Opti-
mum Product Diversity, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 297 (1977); Spence, Product Selection, Fixed Costs, and
Monopolistic Competition, 43 REV. ECON. STUD. 217 (1976).
58. California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM, 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979); Telex Corp. v. IBM,
510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975); Transamerica Computer Co. v.
IBM, 459 F. Supp. 626 (N.D. Cal. 1978), 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979), appeal docketed, No.
80-4048 (9th Cir. Jan. 31, 1980). See also Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak, Co., 603 F.2d 263
(2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 969
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-3 (N.D. Ill. June 19, 1980), appeal docketed, No. 80-
2171 (7th Cir. Aug. 27, 1980); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal.
1978), afid sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. IBM, 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980).
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tion of a new system into an existing systems market, coupled with price
adjustments on components of the old system, is anticompetitive. Under
the proposed general standard of predation, a finding of predatory conduct
requires both a showing of motive and a showing of profit sacrifice. There
is no clear motive for predatory systems rivalry if the dominant firm can
earn all of the monopoly profits obtainable in the market by charging an
elevated price for the component of the system over which the dominant
firm already possesses monopoly power. Monopoly power over one com-
ponent of a system, however, is not always sufficient for a dominant firm
to extract all the monopoly profits obtainable in the systems market. In
such instances, the dominant firm can increase its profit by inducing the
exit of a rival and thereby extending its monopoly power to other systems
components. 9 We argue that the conditions necessary for this incentive for
predation are the rule rather than the exception, and hence that courts
should presume their existence. Of course, a motive for predation also
requires that the systems market is concentrated and protected by entry
hurdles and reentry barriers.
Once the existence of a motive is established, the test for profit sacrifice
proceeds in two stages. The first stage requires an examination of the
post-innovation prices of the components that are compatible with the
products of the rival. The innovator's behavior is free of profit sacrifice
only if he offers to provide his rivals with the necessary compatible com-
ponents at compensatory prices, in preference to making far fewer sales at
higher prices or to making the components unavailable. The prices of old
components are compensatory if they cover the cost of supplying the old
component and yield the same incremental profit as the displaced cross-
elastic sales of new and other components, assuming the rival remains
viable in the systems market. Compensatory prices of old components
should not reflect the additional monopoly profits that the innovator
would earn if a rival were irreversibly driven out of the market.
The second stage of the test for profit sacrifice examines the rationality
of the R&D investment in the new system, under the assumption that the
59. Other writers contend that a firm has no incentive to "lever" its market power from one
market to another. Under this theory, the nature of vertical relations between firms is entirely deter-
mined by efficiency considerations. See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
173-74 (1976) (weakness of leverage theory is inability to explain why firm with monopoly over one
product would want to monopolize complementary products); Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 308 (con-
cluding that dominant firm cannot lever its market power through innovations since attempts at lever-
age impose costs on purchasers of goods). But see Ordover & Willig, Notes on Non-price Anticompe-
titive Practices by Dominant Firms (unpublished paper prepared for the 9th Annual
Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, April 27-30, 1981) (on file with Yale Law Jour-
nal). The Berkey case holds, however, that a new system can be predatory if it would enable a firm
with monopoly power to lever this power into competitive advantage in another market. Berkey
Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F. 2d 263, 275-76, 285-88 (2d Cir. 1979), cen. denied, 444
U.S. 1093 (1980).
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innovator offers the old components at compensatory prices. This stage of
the test, therefore, is conceptually equivalent to the tests developed in sec-
tion III A that dealt with the introduction of substitute products.
1. Basic Concepts in Systems Rivalry
A "system" is a collection or package of complementary products that
are combined by a manufacturer, or a consumer, to yield a final product.
Because the components of the system are complementary products, an
increase in the price of one component reduces the demand for the other
components.10
Figure 1
Frequently, a system can be assembled from complementary compo-
60. For example, an increase in camera prices tends to reduce the demand for film, and an in-
crease in prices of computer central processing units tends to reduce the demand for the associated
peripheral equipment.
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nents that are produced by different manufacturers, as long as the various
components are "compatible" with each other-that is, as long as the
components of various manufacturers are interchangeable without much
loss in their efficiency. If the components of various manufacturers are
compatible, then competition in the systems market is enhanced. Concomi-
tantly, incompatibilities reduce competition, and the creation of incompati-
bilities may increase the monopoly profits of a firm that has monopoly
power over one or more of the components.
Figure 1 diagrammatically summarizes the basic elements of systems
rivalry. Each system consists of two complementary components, denoted
by the numbers 1 and 2. The three manufacturers are denoted by the
letters A, B, and C. Thus, Al stands for the first component manufac-
tured by firm A, and B2 stands for the second component manufacturered
by firm B. A line joining two components indicates that the two compo-
nents are compatible. The absence of a line indicates incompatibility.
Thus, in Figure 1, Al and B2 are compatible, but C1 and A2 are not
compatible. There is substantial intersystem rivalry in the final systems
market, because consumers can select from three distinct systems, all of
which may be perfect substitutes for each other.
In Figure 2, however, firm A has a monopoly over the first component,
Al, and also produces a compatible second component, A2. Firm B spe-
cializes in the production of the second component, which is compatible
with Al. In this market scenario, two business decisions by firm A may
disadvantage the rival firm B, whatever firm A's underlying motive, and
irrespective of the effects of its decisions on competition. First, firm A can
refuse to deal6" with firm B by withholding the complementary component
from the open market and selling it exclusively as a part of a system.
62
Second, firm A may engage in the related tactic of price discrimination. A
price discriminating firm sets two prices-a high price on components that
are sold to a rival or its customers, and a low price on components that
are sold to customers who do not purchase components from a rival. The
extreme form of this strategem is a price that chokes off all effective de-
mand for separate sales of the relevant component; such a price has the
same effect on the rival as a pure refusal to deal.
61. See generally Note, Refusals to Deal by Vertically Integrated Monopolists, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1720 (1974).
62. In Figure 1, the refusal to deal by firm A may have little impact on the ability of firm B to
compete with firm A, because firm C is an alternative source for the complementary component.
Specifically, the impact of firm A's decision is minimized if component Cl is a good substitute for Al
in the opinion of consumers; component B2 can easily be made compatible with component Cl; and
manufacturer C does not increase the price of Cl after the refusal to deal by firm A. In Figure 2,
however, firm A is the only source of component 1, and a refusal to deal may drive firm B out of the
market unless a new entrant into the market commences production of component 1.




Refusal to deal and price discrimination may be procompetitive regard-
less of their effects on rivals. Both practices would be procompetitive, for
example, if they were necessary to maintain the system's reputation for
quality, the product differentiation of the system,
63 or the supply of requi-
63. In the presence of product differentiation, consumers have the opportunity to choose among
the various aspects of product design for which tastes and needs may differ. Other things being equal,
therefore, product differentiation benefits consumers. Moreover, product differentiation may promote
competition. For example, product differentiation may be essential to new entrants who cannot com-
pete with existing firms merely by mimicking their products. By assembling a system that is distinct
from those of their rivals, entrants may avoid head-on price competition, at least until after they can




In other instances, however, the two strategies may be anticompetitive,
and transparently without a business justification other than the pursuit of
monopoly power. To avoid the appearance of anticompetitive intent, a
firm may employ a less obviously anticompetitive strategy that still per-
mits the extension of its monopoly power over one component into monop-
oly power over the entire systems market. The introduction of new sys-
tems can be a camouflaged anticompetitive strategy, precisely because the
introduction of new products or systems is typically regarded as procom-
petitive and beneficial to consumer welfare."'
The introduction of a new system can disadvantage rivals in at least
two ways. First, if the new system is superior to existing systems, demand
for the existing systems will decline. Second, the innovator may constrict
the supply" of the components that are compatible with those of the rival
by increasing the prices of preexisting components, or discontinuing their
production. Discontinuance of the old components is particularly damag-
ing to the rival's profits; the more incompatible the rival's components are
with the new components, the more costly it is for the rival to introduce
components that are compatible with the innovator's new components, and
the more costly or inferior are the substitute components available from
other producers in the market. Although these injuries to rivals may be
incidental to socially beneficial product innovation, they are the primary
motivation for predatory product innovations.
If the innovating dominant firm continues to supply the old components
at compensatory prices, the introduction of the new system can be tested
for predation using the tests developed in Section III A. Distinct issues
arise, however, if the defendant increases the prices of existing compo-
nents above their compensatory level; because the potentially predatory
conduct does not involve a price cut, but rather a price increase, the stan-
dard comparison between prices and costs is inappropriate.
systems to rivals, however, product differentiation may not be feasible. See U.S. v. Columbia Pictures
Indus., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
64. See Berkey Photo Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 287 (2d Cir. 1979)(concluding
that market acceptance of innovation is best indicator of product quality and of benefit to public as
long as market permits free choice of consumers); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 458 F.
Supp. 423, 439 (N.D. Cal. 1978), afi'd sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. IBM, 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir.
1980) (same, with proviso that consumer's choices have not been manipulated by the monopolist);
Comment, Antitrust Scrutiny of Monopolists' Innovations: Berkey Photo Inc v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
93 HARV. L. REV. 408, 414-15 n.60 (1979) (concurring with view expressed in Berkey).
65. In general, an innovator can constrict the supply of compatible components in several ways:
refusing to deal with the rival; selling the components only as a complete system; pricing the compo-
nents in a way that discriminates against rivals; selling the components as a complete system in combi-
nation with high individual prices for the compatible components if sold separately; underpricing
components that compete with the components of rivals; overpricing components that are compatible
with the components of rivals; or, as suggested in the text, introducing a new system that is incompati-
ble with rivals' products while overpricing or withdrawing the necessary preexisting components.
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Nonetheless, the proposed general standard of predatory behavior yields
workable tests for predatory systems rivalry. For conduct involving the
introduction of a new system and an attendant price revision to be preda-
tory, the dominant firm must have a motive for inducing the exit of a
rival, the challenged conduct must substantially increase the probability
that the rival will exit, and the conduct must entail a profit sacrifice in
comparison to the profits that could be earned, with the continued viabil-
ity of the rival, if the innovator pursued an alternative strategy.
2. Motives for Predation: The Economics of Vertical Price Squeezes
When a firm has monopoly power over one component in a system,
conventional economic wisdom suggests that the firm can extract all the
monopoly profit available in the systems market by charging a sufficiently
high price for the monopolized component-that is, by executing a vertical
price squeeze. If that is true, why should the firm bother to engage in
predation against a rival manufacturer of a complementary component?
The answer to this question is critical to the understanding of the profit
motive for tactical exit inducement in the systems' context, and also to the
construction of tests for predatory profit sacrifice.
Consider a market scenario in which a firm with market power has no
motive to induce the exit of its rival. In Figure 3, the dominant firm can
extract all the monopoly profit that is available in the systems market by
subjecting the rival to a carefully designed vertical price squeeze. The unit
incremental cost of the first component is equal to c, and the unit incre-
mental cost of the second component is equal to a, regardless of who pro-
duces it. Assume that all consumers are identical and have a maximum
willingness to pay of b for either system. If the system price is b or less,
each consumer will buy one system. If the price exceeds b, consumers will
not buy any systems.
In this scenario, the viability of firm B need not diminish the monopoly
profits of firm A.66 To see this, consider the profits that firm A can earn in
the absence of firm B, and then consider the profits that firm A can earn
with a perfect price squeeze against a viable firm B.
In the absence of firm B, firm A will maximize its profit by selling
systems to consumers at the highest possible price-their willingness to
pay of b. Since each system costs c+a to produce, each sale yields a profit
margin of b-(c+a). Firm A's total profit is equal to b-(c+a) multiplied
by the number of sales in the entire systems market.
66. In fact, if the rival is a more efficient producer of component two, then the profits of firm A
are larger if firm B remains viable. See note 67 infra.





Now suppose that firm B is a viable competitor of firm A. The presence
of firm B constrains the equilibrium price of type-two components to a,
their unit cost. Nonetheless, firm A can extend its monopoly power over
type-one components to the entire systems market by charging a price of b
for entire systems, a price of b-a in the open market for type-one compo-
nents, and a price of a in the open market for type-two components.
Then, a direct sale of a whole system by firm A has b-(c+a) as its profit
margin. A system that is comprised of components Al and B2 yields to
firm A a profit of (b-a)-c, through its sale of component Al at the price of
(b-a) and with the cost of c. Finally, a system assembled by consumers
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that is comprised of components Al and A2 yields to firm A a profit of (b-
a)-c on its sale of Al and no profit on its sale of A2 at cost. Thus, with a
perfect price squeeze, firm A does not lose profits if consumers choose
systems that include the rival's component rather than systems that are
wholly comprised of firm A's own components,"' and firm A has no incen-
tive to extend its monopoly power to the second component.
Such a perfect price squeeze, however, requires that all of the profits
available in the systems market be captured through the markup on the
monopolized component. One impediment to the execution of such a price
squeeze may arise when system components can be utilized in different
mixes by different consumers. For example, consumers who demand rela-
tively more of the non-monopolized components for their systems may
have a more than proportionately greater willingness-to-pay for systems.
Then, only prices that embody a relatively high markup on the non-mo-
nopolized component and a relatively low markup on the monopolized
component can transfer to suppliers the willingness-to-pay of these con-
sumers along with the smaller willingness-to-pay of other consumers.
Such prices constitute a form of price discrimination in the systems market
between the different groups of consumers. They are infeasible in the
presence of competition in the sale of the non-monopolized component,
however, and are inconsistent with the use of a price squeeze. Thus, if
this type of price discrimination is necessary for a monopolist to derive
maximum profits from the systems market, a firm with monopoly power
over one component has incentives to extend its power to other
components.
The desire to price discriminate, however, is not the only obstacle to the
implementation of a price squeeze. Regulated firms, for example, may be
unable to charge the unbalanced markups needed to implement a perfect
price squeeze. Alternatively, consumers may underestimate their demand
for the components subject to competition and this circumstance may en-
large the profit-maximizing markup on those components. In addition,
consumer uncertainty about the value of a given system may call for pro-
motional pricing of the very component that must carry a high markup in
a price squeeze.
The most important type of impediment to the use of a price squeeze,
however, is the existence of an alternative source of supply of the monopo-
67. If firm B can produce type two components at a lower cost than firm A, say a', firm A can
extract the maximum profits available in the systems market only if firm B remains viable. The profit
maximizing tactic for firm A is to set a price for Al of b-a', and a price for the entire system just
above b. Then, firm B cannot price B2 above a', because a higher price would raise the total cost of a
system above consumers' willingness to pay. Hence, firm A would not sell any units of A2, and would
earn a profit of b-a'-c on each sale of Al. This is the maximum profit available in the systems market,
and it exceeds b-a-c, which is the maximum profit in the absence of firm B.
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lized component, which is of inferior quality or which incurs a higher cost
of production, but which limits the markup that the market will bear on
the monopolized component. Figure 4 depicts a market scenario in which
the monopoly power of the dominant firm is limited by an inferior source
of supply." There are now three firms in the market: the dominant firm
A, which manufactures both system components, and the specialized
firms, B and C, which manufacture only one component. Assume that the
dominant firm has a relatively small cost advantage over the other manu-
facturer of the first component, equal to d.
Figure 4
Absent the rival manufacturer of the second component, firm B, firm
A's small cost advantage over firm C could be levered into substantial
monopoly profits. Firm A could set the system price at b and earn the
maximum profit of b-(a+c) on each system sold." With firm B in the
market, however, the competing perfect substitute system of C1 and B2
68. The model in the text applies whether the inferior source of supply is an actual or a potential
rival of the dominant firm A.
69. See pp. 36-37 supra.
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can be sold for a total price of a+c+d, and this amount is then the maxi-
mum that firm A can charge for a system. At that price, the profit margin
for firm A is only d. Of course, in the absence of both of the competing
firms B and C, firm A could earn b-(a+c) on each system-the full mo-
nopoly profit available in the systems market.
In some instances, the most effective way for firm A to earn the full
monopoly profit is to drive firm C out of the market. In particular, a
nonpredatory price of c for component Al would divert all sales of compo-
nent one from firm C to firm A, and might thereby induce firm C's exit.
The viability of firm C, however, may not rest on events in the market in
question. Instead, component C1 may have alternative uses for which Al
does not suffice. Thus, firm C might survive despite the postulated cost
advantage of component Al over component C1 in this market." Alterna-
tively, firm C may face very low reentry barriers. Under such circum-
stances, only the exit of firm B will enable firm A to capture the full
monopoly profit available in the systems market,"' and the existence of an
inferior source of supply provides the dominant firm with a motive for
tactical exit inducement.
In applying the proposed test for predation, courts should not require a
detailed, dispositive showing of alternative though inferior sources of sup-
ply, because such sources of supply are common in actual systems mar-
kets." To satisfy the motive element of the test for predation, however, a
70. Firm C can survive in the long-run either because its product has purposes for which compo-
nent Al is ill-suited or because its productive capacity has other uses. Of course, if the viability of firm
C depends upon sales of C in the market with Al, it cannot withstand competition from firm A, and
it will exit the market. Because of the other uses for firm C's products or capacity, however, it re-
mains a potential competitor, and constrains the market power of firm A as long as firm B remains
viable.
71. In this scenario, the most direct way for firm A to induce the exit of firm B involves a refusal
to deal and a low systems price: firm A refuses to sell the first component in the open market, and
prices its complete system just below a+c+d. At this price, consumers will not demand systems
assembled from components Cl and B2 unless firms B or C are willing to sell their components below
cost.
If the dominant firm cannot refuse to deal with firm B, however, it may still induce the exit of firm
B by selling the second component below cost. For example, firm A can sell the first component for
c+d, and price the second component below a, its incremental unit cost. This tactic obviously violates
the Areeda-Turner test, as well as the cost-based price floors proposed in this article. See pp. 15-19
supra.
Alternatively, firm A may induce the exit of firm B by charging in the open market a discrimina-
tory price for Al that is slightly below c+d, while setting a lower internal transfer price for Al and
an internal price for A2 equal to a. In so doing, firm A can sell a complete system in the market for
less than consumers must pay for a system comprised of Al and B2. The unit production cost of A2
provides a "conservative" estimate for the imputed internal price of A2 because it results in a larger
estimate of the imputed price for Al than would any other figure not below the cost of A2. Then, if
this estimate of the imputed price for Al is smaller than the actual price charged for Al in the open
market, the latter price is discriminatory and has the effect of excluding firm B from the market to the
advantage of firm A.
72. There is an alternative source of supply if the rival's components can be utilized in the sys-
tems market with components other than those supplied by the defendant firm. These alternatives
may be newly developed products, or newly modified versions of products with other uses. All that is
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demonstration of other structural conditions in the system market remains
necessary. First, the defendant must possess monopoly power over some of
the components of the system. Second, entry hurdles into the overall sys-
tems market must exist. Third, if there are alternative, inferior sources of
supply of the components over which the defendant exercises monopoly
power, there must be entry hurdles and reentry barriers into the produc-
tion of the other components needed to complete a system. Finally, if im-
plicit price discrimination would be profitable, entry hurdles and reentry
barriers into the supply of components that would undermine implicit
price discrimination must exist. The existence of all of these structural
conditions may create a motive for predatory exit inducement.
3. Predatory Systems Rivalry, Compensatory Pricing of Complementary
Components, and the Analysis of Research and Development
Investments
The introduction of a new system is predatory only if it entails a sacri-
fice of profit given the continued viability of the rival.7 Because competi-
tion in the systems market as a whole protects the interests of consumers,
the relevant market for the definition of a rival's viability is the final sys-
tems market.7' Consequently, the continued viability premise implies more
than an absence of reentry barriers; even if the productive assets of the
rival remain available for production, the rival is not viable in the systems
market if compatible components are unavailable." The absence of com-
necessary is thai some alternative system would become economical if the dominant firm attempted to
raise the prices on its preexisting component to the point where they would extract the total monopoly
profit from the systems market. Hence, the alternative will not always be identifiable by the uses to
which it is presently put, because the dominant firm will have incentives to maintain its prices below
the point at which it becomes economical. For example, in Telex, the court noted that Telex's per-
ipherals could be made compatible with Burroughs' CPU's, even though this was not the economic
choice in view of the pricing policy of IBM. Telex Corp. v. IBM, 510 F.2d 894, 916 (10th Cir.
1975), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
73. See note 75 infra (meaning of viability in context of systems rivalry).
74. Concededly, the systems market is not always the relevant market. For example, after a dur-
able product is purchased by consumers, there may be a distinct market for replacement parts or for
accessories compatible with the product. For consumers who are not locked-in to a particular system,
however, the systems market is the appropriate market for antitrust scrutiny.
Similarly, if consumers underestimate their need for a system component, they will place too little
weight on its price in choosing which system to purchase. Hence, in addition to competition in the
systems market, competition in the supply of that component is necessary. With correctly informed
consumers, however, the relevant market again is the systems market.
75. One could define viability narrowly in terms of the rival's ability to offer components that are
compatible with the new system, rather than in terms of the rival's ability to compete in the systems
market. This pro-rival conception of viability, however, suffers from irresolvable difficulties. In many
instances, the rival's preexisting components may be technologically incompatible with the new sys-
tem, and the narrower definition of viability would imply that the rival has access to the innovative
designs embodied in the new system. Such acciss could unduly constrict the temporary quasi-monop-
oly profits available to the innovator, however, and thereby chill socially beneficial innovation. That is,
for an innovating firm to recoup its initial outlay on R&D, it must be assured some respite from
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patible components implies that: the defendant refuses to sell the compo-
nents at compensatory prices; there are no existing alternative suppliers of
compatible components; there are barriers that prevent the entry of an
alternative supplier; and the rival is unable to produce, quickly and at
sufficiently low cost, components that are compatible with the new system.
Profit sacrifice is present if there exists an alternative action, less dam-
aging to the rival, that yields to the incumbent a higher level of profit
under the continued viability premise. If the rival is a manufacturer of
complementary products, the less damaging alternative action involves
prices that are lower than the actual prices of the necessary complemen-
tary components. The repricing or withdrawal policy of the innovator ex-
hibits profit sacrifice if a lower price is feasible76 and yields no less profit
on the premise of the continued viability of the rival.
A lower price on the preexisting component has four distinct effects on
the profits of the innovator. First, it increases profit by the markups on
the additional sales of the preexisting component, and by the markups on
the innovator's additional sales of complementary products. Second, it
reduces profit from sales of the preexisting component that would have
been made at the higher price. Third, it reduces profit by the markups on
the diverted sales of the new components. Fourth, because a lower price
on the preexisting component is less likely to induce the rival's exit, it
reduces the future profits of the innovator by diminishing his future mo-
nopoly power (if any) in the systems market.
This fourth effect may provide a motive to induce exit by the introduc-
tion of new components and the repricing of old components. This effect
on profit, however, is eliminated under the premise of the continued via-
bility of the rival in the systems market." Thus, the test for predatory
profit sacrifice should disregard profits that are only possible as a result of
the actual exclusion of the rival.78
imitation-an "imitation lag." If the imitation lag shrinks to zero, rivals can generally undersell the
innovator and still make a positive incremental profit because their expenditures on imitative R&D
are generally lower than the R&D expenditures of the innovator. To cope with this problem, a court
would have to determine the socially optimal duration of the imitation lag for each new system, and
would have to decide whether the innovating firm has unduly lengthened the imitation lag. Such
findings would inevitably contain substantial errors; prospective innovators might reduce their invest-
ments in R&D in fear of such errors, thereby stifling the innovative process.
76. If the costs of providing the preexisting components are prohibitive, the compensatory price
will be prohibitive. This may occur if the production of the old components renders the production of
the new components physically impossible, or vice-versa.
77. In making the profit assessment, data that pertain to the period following the introduction of
the innovation but preceding the actual exclusion of the rival are the most useful. When the attribu-
tion of incremental profits to various components is ambiguous due to data limitations, conservative
methods should be chosen so as to bias the scrutiny of profit sacrifice in favor of the innovator. A
useful rule of thumb may be to exclude from consideration any loss of profits on the part of the
innovator from new line components that substitute for the rival's components.
78. Similar analysis applies in the context of predatory pricing. For example, a price below cost
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a. Compensatory Prices
The compensatory price for a preexisting component is the lowest price
that would compensate the innovator for making the component available,
under the continued viability premise. Thus, an innovator who substan-
tially damages rivals by refusing to sell preexisting components, rather
than selling them at compensatory prices, is sacrificing profit under the
proposed standard. Although the innovator may set a price above the com-
pensatory level if such a price yields an even higher profit contingent on
the rival's viability, prices higher than the compensatory level may entail
predatory profit sacrifice.
For example, if sales of the old component divert sales of the new com-
ponent on a one-to-one basis, and if sales of the old component have no
other effects on the innovator's profits, then the compensatory price con-
tains a markup over cost exactly equal to the markup over cost on the
new-line component. In this simple case, the one-to-one diversion of sales
occurs if the price differential between a system comprised of new compo-
nents and a system comprised of old components exceeds consumers' eval-
uation of the quality differential between the two systems. Predatory
profit sacrifice is present if the rival must exit because the incumbent sets
a price above the compensatory level, and if the rival or its customers
would purchase the preexisting component at a lower but supra-compen-
satory price. By the definition of a compensatory price, a lower price
above the compensatory level would increase the profits of the innovator
under the continued viability premise, because the markup on the addi-
tional sales of the preexisting component would exceed the markup on the
diverted sales of the new-line component.
9
The following model of a market with an inferior source of supply 0
illustrates the calculation of the compensatory price under these assump-
tions. Figure 5 provides the structure of this hypothetical market. The
symbols Al' and A2 denote the components of the new system introduced
by the dominant firm A. The associated unit costs are c' and a', and con-
may be defended as a promotional device. Cf M. PORTER, INTERBRAND CHOICE, STRATEGY AND
BILATERAL MARKET POWER (1976) (extensive up-to-date discussion of promotional strategies). If fu-
ture sales are complementary to current sales, a low or even negative markup on current sales may be
justified by higher future revenues. When complementarity exists, however, the future markups used
to assess profit sacrifice should reflect the assumed viability of the rival; otherwise, predation would be
logically impossible.
79. If the diversion of sales is not one-to-one, or the sales of the old component have other effects
on the innovator's profits, then the equal markup rule for compensatory pricing must be modified. For
example, if the sale of one preexisting component diverts the sale of more than one new-line compo-
nent, the compensatory markup must equal the sum of the markups on those diverted sales. In gen-
eral, the compensatory price must reflect all three of the effects that the post-innovation price of old-
line components has on the innovator's profits under the continued viability premise. See p. 42 supra.
80. See pp. 38-41 supra.
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sumers' willingness-to-pay for the new system is b'. As indicated, the new
components are incompatible with the old components of all three manu-
facturers. Nothing is assumed at this point about the technological or eco-
nomic superiority of the new system.
Figure 5
In this scenario, firm A can induce the exit of firm B with the following
two-part tactic: First, firm A sets the price of Al at a level denoted by p.
Second, firm A offers the new system, composed of Al' and A2, at a price
P's that is low enough to induce all consumers to choose the new system
over the preexisting system comprised of Al and B2, sold at a price of
p+a, and over the preexisting system comprised of C1 and B2, even if
that system is sold at its cost of c+d+a. Thus, p's is set such that b'-ps,
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the consumer surplus"t from the new system, is greater than both b -
(p+a) and b - (c+d+a), which represent the consumer surplus from the
systems comprised of Al and B2, and Cl and B2, respectively. As a con-
sequence, the sales of component B2 fall to zero, and the viability of firm
B is threatened. As noted above, firm A's motive for exit inducement in
this scenario may be the additional monopoly profit attendant on the ir-
reversible exit of firm B.
To determine whether predatory profit sacrifice has occurred, one must
inquire whether a price for Al lower than p, the price actually charged,
would be less damaging to firm B and would increase the profit of firm A
given the continued viability of firm B. Due to the presence in the market
of the component Cl, firm B is viable8" until the dispersal of its productive
assets. Thus, the test for profit sacrifice can utilize data from the time
period between the introduction of the new system and the exit of firm B.
During this period, a price for component Al that induces the exit of
firm B eliminates sales of both B2 and Al. Hence, if a lower price for Al
would stimulate sales of Al at a markup greater than the markup on the
diverted sales of the new system, the actual price of Al entails predatory
profit sacrifice.
The price of Al that compensates firm A for lost sales of the new sys-
tem, the compensatory price, can be calculated as follows: 3 The profit on
the sale of each new system is p's-a'-c'. If each sale of Al displaces the
sale of one new system, then the compensatory price must provide firm A
with a profit per unit just equal to the lost profit on a new system. Thus,
because the cost of Al is c, the compensatory price is c+p's-a'-c'. Firm A
is guilty of predatory profit sacrifice if it refuses to reduce the price of Al
to this compensatory level, and maintains instead a higher actual price,
thereby choking off all sales of Al.
Of course, the compensatory price for Al may be above its actual price
of p. A price for Al that induces the exit of firm B, however, can be less
than or equal to the compensatory price if and only if the new system is
economically superior to the old system, without consideration (yet) of the
R&D costs for the new system." Thus, in this model of systems rivalry,
81. Consumer surplus is equal to the difference between the maximum amount that a consumer
will pay for a given quantity of a good and the amount actually paid for that quantity of the good. See
Willig, Consumer's Surplus Without Apology, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 589 (1976).
82. See pp. 41-42 supra.
83. Alternatively, the compensatory price can be calculated as the price that yields the same
markup on Al as the markup on the parallel new component, Al', when the latter markup is calcu-
lated conservatively. See note 77 supra. Both calculations yield the same result.
84. Specifically, one can find values of p and p', such that (i) b-(p+a) < b'-p's; (ii) b-(c+d+a)
< b'-p's; and (iii) p<c+p's-a'-c', if and only if b'-(c'+a') > b-(c+a). Condition (i) is that con-
sumers prefer the new system to Al and B2, when B2 is priced at cost; (ii) is that consumers prefer
the new system to Cl and B2, when they are both priced at cost; and (iii) is that the price of Al does
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the compensatory price test protects social welfare.
To establish this proposition, assume first that b'-(c'+ a'), the net social
benefit from the production and consumption of a new system (exclusive
of initial R&D outlays), exceeds b-(c+a), the corresponding net social
benefit from the old system. Then, firm A can induce the exit of firm B by
setting p', just below (b'-b)+(c+d+ a), while setting p at the correspond-
ing compensatory level just below (b'-(c'+a'))-(b-(c+a))+(c+d).85
These exit-inducing prices have the following interpretation: the new sys-
tem price, p's, is just below the cost of producing a system comprised of
components manufactured by A's rivals, (c+d+a), plus consumers' eval-
uation of the quality advantage of the new system over the old system, (b'-
b). Thus (b'-b)+(c+d+a) is the maximum amount that consumers are
willing to pay for the new system if the rivals of firm A, firms B and C,
are viable competitors in the systems market. The corresponding compen-
satory price for Al is equal to the difference between the maximum profit
that can be earned on the sale of a new system, (b°-(c'+a')), and the
maximum profit on the sale of an old system, (b-(c+a)), plus the cost of
the inferior supplier, (c+d). Note that (b'-(c'+a')) and (b-(c+a)) also
represent the net social benefits, exclusive of R&D costs, from a new and
an old system, respectively, and that c+d is the maximum price that firm
A can charge for Al in the face of competition from C1. Thus, the com-
pensatory price yields to firm A the maximum possible price for Al given
the viability of firm C, (c+d), plus a profit increment equal to the differ-
ence in potential profitability between a sale of the new system and a sale
of the old system. If that profit increment is positive, as postulated above,
the compensatory price is above (c+d).
At these prices for Al and for the new system, firm B cannot sell B2 at
any price at or above production cost, because the consumer's surplus
from the Cl, B2 system offered at cost, b-(c+d+a), is just below the
consumer's surplus from the new system, b'-p.. Moreover, because the
actual price for Al, p, (through compensatory) is above (c+d), consumers
prefer C1 offered at (c+d) to Al offered at p. Thus, firm A can induce
the exit of firm B without violating the compensatory price test.
not exceed its compensatory level. The relationship b'-(c'+a') > b-(c+a) implies that the net social
benefit from the production and consumption of a new system exceeds that from the old system. The
truth of this proposition can be established by straightforward algebra.
85. Firm A earns a profit of p's - (a'+c') on each sale of the new system. Given the hypothesized
value of p's, the profit on such a sale is (b'-b+c+d+a) - (a'+c'). Firm A loses one sale of a new
system for every consumer purchase of an old system comprised of one unit of B2 or A2 and one unit
of Al. Consequently, in the absence of anticompetitive objectives, firm A willingly would sell Al at a
markup at least equal to the profit lost on a diverted sale of the new system. If p is the price of Al,
then firm A earns a profit of p-c on each sale of Al. Hence, if p is set compensatorily, p-c will equal
(b'-b+c+d+a) -(a'+c'). From this equality, the compensatory level of p can be calculated as (b'-
(a'+c')) - (b-(a+c)) + (c+d), as stated in the text.
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Now assume that the old system is economically superior to the new
system, even without accounting for the R&D costs of the new system, so
that b-(c+a) exceeds b'-(c'+a'). Then, firm A cannot induce firm B's
exit without violating the compensatory price test. Suppose first that firm
A sets the price of Al, p above c+d, so that Cl, sold at cost, is preferred
to Al. To induce all consumers to purchase the new system rather than
the system comprised of Cl and B2, firm A must then set p's such that b'-
p's exceeds b-(c+d+a)-that is, such that the consumer surplus from a
new system exceeds the consumer surplus from an old system comprised
of C1 and B2. Therefore, p's must be less than b'-b+c+d+a, which is
the maximum amount that consumers are willing to pay for the new sys-
tem if the old syste m is sold at cost. Consequently, the corresponding com-
pensatory price of Al, p's-a'-c'+c, must be less than (b'-b+c+d+a) -a'-
c'+c. The latter expression is equivalent to (c+d) + (b'-a'-c') - (b-a-c),
which is less than (c+d) under the hypothesis that (b-a-c) exceeds (b'-a'-
c'). Hence, the compensatory price of Al is less than c+d, and because
(by hypothesis) the actual price, p, is above c+d, the actual price of Al
exceeds the compensatory price. Thus, if firm A sets p above (c+d), and
sets p's to divert all sales from the economically superior old system, the
price of Al, p, fails the compensatory price test.
Suppose instead that firm A sets p below c+d, so that the systems com-
prised of Al and B2 or Al and A2 are the consumers' best alternatives to
the new system. Then, for firm A to drive the demand for B2 to zero, p's
must be set such that b'-p's exceeds b-(p+a)-that is, such that the con-
sumer surplus from a new system exceeds the consumer surplus from an
old system 'comprised of Al and either A2 or B2. If b'-p's exceeds b-
(p+a), p exceeds p's+b-a-b'. But the latter quantity exceeds the compen-
satory price for Al, p' s-a'-c'+c, by (b-c-a)-(b'-c'-a'), which (by hypothe-
sis) is positive. Hence, if firm A sets p below (c+d) and sets p', in order
to divert all sales from the economically superior old system, the price of
Al again fails the compensatory price test.
In summary, firm A can set prices such that: all consumers prefer the
new system to the old; firm B is driven from the market; and the price of
Al satisfies the compensatory price test, if and only if the displacement of
the old system by the new system is socially beneficial, treating R&D costs
for the new system as sunk costs that cannot be recovered.
b. Research and Development Costs
The second part of the test for predatory profit sacrifice examines the
motive for the R&D investment in the new system. The proposed general
standard implies that R&D expenses are not predatory if they are less
than the anticipated additional net revenues made possible by the innova-
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tion, given a compensatory price for Al. Assume, in the context of the
model above, that b'-(c'+a') exceeds b-(c+a), so that the induced exit of
firm B is consistent with compensatory pricing of Al.
Firm A's net revenues are maximized by the highest level of P's that is
feasible with the continued viability of firms B and C, i.e., b'-b+c+d+a.
The corresponding net revenue per system is (b'-b+c+d+a)-(a'+c), or
(b'-a'-c')-(b-a-c) + d. Absent the development of the new system, the max-
imum net revenue available to firm A is d per system. Therefore, the
incremental net revenue per system attributable to the innovation, under
the continued viability premise, is the difference between these two
figures-(b'-c'-a')-(b-c-a).
The test for predatory sacrifice is whether this difference in net revenue
per system, as anticipated at the time of the R&D investment decision, is
large enough to justify the R&D outlay. If so, then the R&D investment
is justified by an innocent profit motive, even though it results in the exit
of firm B. If not, however, only predatory objectives can rationalize the
R&D expenditures. This test coincides exactly with the test of whether
the R&D investment is socially warranted; the social benefits from the
displacement of the old system by the new system exceed the costs of the
innovation if and only if (b'-c'-a') - (b-c-a) times the number of systems
customers exceeds the R&D expense."6
Thus, the proposed tests for compensatory pricing and for the R&D
motive conduce to social welfare. They permit socially desirable innova-
86. The results in the text implicitly assume that the production costs of Al are not changed by
the introduction of the new system. If the production costs of Al change due to the introduction of the
new line, however, say from c to e, the tests remain socially optimal if modified slightly. Specifically,
one can show that there exist values of p's and P, (the new price of Al) such that (i) p's = a'+c'; (ii)
b-P's >= b-(a+c+d); (iii) b'-p's >= b-(a+pl); and (iv) pl-e : p's-(a'+c') if and only if (v) b'-
(a'+c') > b-(a+e) and (vi) b'-(a'+c') 1 b-(a+c+d). The interpretations of these relationships are
as follows: (i) the new system is priced at or above production costs; (ii) the consumer surplus from
the new system equals or exceeds that from Cl and B2 sold at cost; (iii) the consumer surplus from
the new system equals or exceeds that from Al and B2; (iv) the markup on Al relative to its new cost
does not exceed that on the new system, so that P, is not supra-compensatory; and (v) and (vi) the net
social benefits from the consumption and production of the new system equal or exceed those from an
old system comprised of either Al and B2 or C1 and B2, where the relevant cost of Al is its new
level, e. Thus, firm A can induce the exit of firm B by diverting all sales to the new system with prices
that are compensatory and cover costs, if and only if the new system is socially preferable to the old
system, without consideration of R&D costs, and with reference to the new level of production costs
for the old system.
One can also show that firm A's profit-maximizing prices, among those that cover production costs,
are compensatory, and divert all sales to the new system (that is, which satisfy (i)-(iv) above), yield
profits equal to N[(b'-a'-c') - (b-a-c-d)]-R, where N is the number of system customers. Because the
maximum profits from the old system are Nd, the change in the innovator's profits is N[(b'-a'-c')-
(b-a-c)]-R, given compensatory prices not below costs, and the continued viability premise. This quan-
tity is exactly equal to the change in net social benefits attributable to the innovation. Hence, when
production costs for the old components are altered by the innovation, the proposed tests for predation
promote social welfare if they are augmented by the stipulation that the price of the new system must
cover its production costs.
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tions, whatever their effects on market structure, and they simultaneously
restrain socially wasteful innovations whose only motivation is the addi-
tional monopoly profits attendant on their anticompetitive effects. For ex-
ample, if the new system is technologically inferior to the old one, and if
its incremental production cost is not substantially lower, then the com-
pensatory price for the old component enables an equally efficient rival to
sell the old system at a price that yields consumers greater net benefits
than the purchase of a new system. Thus, the predatory and socially
wasteful R&D investment in the new system is deterred.
Moreover, the technological superiority of a new system does not pre-
clude a finding of predatory product innovation. Instead, the requisite
R&D investment must be scrutinized for the underlying motive by com-
paring the anticipated costs of the innovation with its anticipated incre-
mental net revenues, calculated on the premise that the rival has contin-
ued access to necessary preexisting components. Under this standard, a
new system is immune from a finding of predation if and only if the value
to consumers of the new system relative to the preexisting system is
greater than the required development costs.8 7
C. An Alternative Test
Another test for predatory product introduction is applicable in some
special circumstances. This test inquires whether an alternative, less ex-
clusionary design of the new product would yield a higher incremental
profit to the innovator than the design actually chosen, under the premise
of the continued viability of the rival. More often than not, this test is too
speculative to be of legal value, but in some instances an alternative design
that is less exclusionary, less costly, and no less desirable to consumers
may be evident." The decision by a defendant to reject such a design en-
87. Concededly, the optimality properties of the proposed tests have not been formally analyzed in
models more general and complex than those developed in the text.
88. In a recent case, the plaintiff urged the court as part of the predation test to incorporate the
profits that the innovator sacrificed by selecting the actual product design over an available less exclu-
sionary design. Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM, 459 F. Supp. 626 (1978). In that case the
plaintiff, Transamerica, argued that to test for predatory profit sacrifice it is necessary "to subtract
from the profits IBM predicted it would realize on a particular product the estimated profits that
might have been realized on a product that could have been produced in its stead." Id. at 631. These
forgone profits are referred to as opportunity costs. Id. Judge Schnacke ruled that the use of the
concept of opportunity costs is improper as a matter of law. Id.
The analysis in this article suggests that the positions taken by TCC and by Judge Schnacke are
both incorrect. In contrast to the rule proposed by Transamerica, our standard implies that the rele-
vant comparison is between the profits the discarded design would have earned under the premise of
the continued viability of the innovator's rivals and the profits that the adopted design would have
earned under the same premise. And, contrary to Judge Schnacke's ruling, our analysis shows that if
the correcdy calculated opportunity costs are sufficiently large, then the chosen product design may
entail predatory profit sacrifice, which is the hallmark of predatory behavior. At the same time, Judge
Schnacke correctly recognized that calculation of the profits that would be generated by an alternative
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tails a predatory sacrifice of profit.
When applicable, this test also promotes social welfare. Specifically, an
exclusionary new design is socially preferable to an alternative design that
is compatible with a rival's component, if and only if the former would be
more profitable than the latter under the continued viability premise, with
preexisting components offered at compensatory prices, and net of R&D
costs.89 Thus, an exclusionary design may be socially optimal even if a
less-exclusionary alternative design exists. On the other hand, an exclu-
sionary design may be motivated by the prospect of additional monopoly
power attendant on the exit of a rival. Such designs waste social resources
and entail a predatory profit sacrifice.
D. The Burden of Proof
Although antitrust scrutiny of product innovation in principle can pro-
mote social welfare," the possibility exists that judicial adoption of the
proffered standard might spur excessive, costly litigation over product in-
novations. In our opinion, however, the danger of excessive litigation is
small due to the burden of proof that the standard places on prospective
product design may be highly speculative. For this reason, if a chosen design earns at least a normal
rate of profit under the premise of continued viability, it perhaps should be viewed as free of preda-
tory profit sacrifice, unless there is an evident alternative that is less exclusionary and clearly more
profitable under the viability premise. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F. 2d 263,
288-89 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1061 (1980); Note, An Economic and Legal Analysis
of Physical Ti-Ins, 89 YALE L.J. 769, 793-94 n.115 (1980).
89. As shown above, see note 85 supra, if the preexisting component, Al, is available to the rival
at a compensatory price, the maximum profits per system customer that the innovator can earn (gross
of R&D costs) from the exclusionary new system are (b'-a'-c') - (b-a-c)+d. This quantity must be
compared with the maximum profit that the innovator can earn from an alternative new design that is
compatible with the rival's component, B2. Let the consumers' willingness-to-pay for this alternative
system equal b", let the production cost of the alternative monopolized component, Al", equal c',
and let the R&D costs of this component equal R'*. Because Al" is compatible both with B2 and A2,
the introduction of the alternative system would not endanger the viability of firm B, would not
require firm A to maintain a compensatory price for Al, and would not affect the competitive price of
a for both B2 and A2. The maximum price at which the new system can be sold is p's, where b"-p';
= b-(c+d+a); at a higher price, consumers would derive greater consumer surplus from purchasing
the old system, Cl and B2, sold at cost. Thus, p" = b"-b+(c+d+a). The corresponding profit on
the alternative system is p's-c"-a=(b"-a-c-) - (b-a-c)+d per systems customer, less the total R&D
costs R". The innovator can earn all of this profit by selling Al " for p"-a, or by selling bundled
systems for ps. Consequently, the difference between the innovator's profits from the exclusionary
design under the continued viability premise and the innovator's profits from the alternative design is
(b'-a'-c*) -(b"-a-c") per systems customer, less the difference in R&D costs, (R-R"). This is precisely
equal to the difference between the net social benefits from the consumption, production, and develop-
ment of the two system designs.
90. In the model that we have analyzed in this article, the only possible cause of social inefficiency
is predatory behavior. We conjecture that this implicit assumption enables our proposed tests to
achieve social optimality. In fact, however, there are other causes of social inefficiency aside from
predation. See note 57 supra (discussing other reasons why profitable product introductions may be
socially inefficient). We would not be surprised or disillusioned to discover that our proposed tests
may sometimes ameliorate and may sometimes exacerbate the social inefficiency caused by other im-
perfections in market performance.
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plaintiffs.
First, the standard narrowly limits the circumstances in which the be-
havior of an innovating firm is to be examined. Moreover, because inno-
vation is generally beneficial, the plaintiff should carry the burden of es-
tablishing the preconditions for the scrutiny of behavior. Thus, under our
standard the plaintiff must establish that the defendant possesses monop-
oly power over certain system components; that there are entry hurdles
and reentry barriers into the final systems market and into the production
of relevant individual components; and that the rival's exit would substan-
tially weaken competition in the systems market. 9' In addition, the plain-
tiff must convincingly show that the rival's exit92 from the systems market
is likely,9 and that the defendant's actions substantially increase the likeli-
hood of exit.
If the plaintiff alleges that the defendant's repricing or withdrawal of
complementary components is predatory, the plaintiff must show that the
components are in fact vital to the viability of the defendant's rivals. Thus,
the components must be shown to be strongly complementary to those of
the rivals, and to be the most preferred complements of the rival's offer-
ings (even in relation to alternatives that the rival could produce himself).
If the plaintiff establishes all of the aforementioned facts, he then may
argue that the defendant's post-innovation behavior entails predatory
profit sacrifice. One way for the plaintiff to succeed in this argument is to
demonstrate that the defendant's rival (or his customers) was willing to
purchase compatible components at prices that were at least compensa-
tory, but that the defendant was unwilling to sell the components at such
prices. 94 Alternatively, if the plaintiff cannot show that the defendant vio-
91. The proposed standard avoids the repression of socially valuable innovations by defining the
relevant market as the market for systems, not the market for components that are compatible with
those of the alleged predator. The narrower market definition would erroneously suggest that the
introduction of a new system may be anticompetitive merely because it creates incompatibilities be-
tween the products of the rival and those of the alleged predator. Innovators require temporary, quasi-
monopoly profits from new designs to recover R&D investments, see app. infra, and hence a focus on
the creation of incompatibilities is inappropriate.
92. Exit may entail either the dispersal of the rival's productive assets or the unavailability of
components that are compatible with the rival's components. See pp. 41-42 supra.
93. The social costs of litigation under our standard will be smaller, the more demanding are the
burden of proof requirements imposed on the plaintiff. The procompetitive benefits from the applica-
tion of our standard, however, derive from the forestalled exit of socially desirable competitors. We
feel that an appropriate balance is struck by requiring a truly dangerous probability of exit; such a
requirement would prevent excessive litigation without destroying the standard's efficacy.
94. The requirement that the innovator offer to sell the old components at compensatory prices
may appear quite harsh, but in fact the opposite is true. First, even if the monopolist refuses to
provide the needed components at compensatory prices, he can nevertheless defend against a charge of
predation by showing that his refusal was part of a bargaining strategy designed to secure supra-
compensatory prices for the components. For this defense to be credible, the monopolist must demon-
strate that he and his rivals engaged in good-faith bargaining over the relevant prices.
Second, the offer to sell at a compensatory price need only be of limited duration. If rivals do not
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lated the compensatory price test, he may prove that the R&D investment
was anticompetitive, in that it entailed a predatory profit sacrifice. Which-
ever argument the plaintiff makes, however, he should carry the burden of
proof, to discourage socially wasteful litigation, to conserve judicial re-
sources, and to avoid chilling the innovative process.
Conclusion
This article has proposed an economic definition of predation, and has
derived from that definition workable tests for predatory price-cutting and
product innovation. These tests go beyond existing tests for predation to
encompass conduct that has proven troublesome to analyze in the past.
The new tests enhance social welfare by deterring exit-inducing anti-com-
petitive conduct, without deterring procompetitive conduct, and without
stimulating excessive litigation.
Appendix: Product Preannouncements
Often, to inform consumers about a new product, an innovator preannounces
the product before it becomes commercially available. In several recent cases, the
innovator's timing of the announcement has been challenged as an anticompetitive
tactic."'
In at least one instance, a product announcement was alleged to be anti-
competitive because it was made substantially ahead of the actual introduction of
the new product.96 In other instances, however, announcements were attacked for
precisely the opposite reason-because they were not issued suffficiently ahead of
avail themselves of the option during twelve months, say, the offer can be discontinued without further
culpability. Concededly, this rule raises the possiblity that the innovator will set the price of the new
system low during the period the offer is in force, only to raise it when the offer expires. For two
reasons, however, this danger is not terribly worrisome. First, compensatory prices are linked to the
prices of new components-if the latter prices decline, so do the former prices-and hence a tempo-
rary reduction in the price of the new system confers a benefit on the rival in terms of a lower
compensatory price. Second, if the price of the new system is set low, the price structure may fail the
predation test that requires that the R&D investment yield sufficiently large incremental profit.
Finally, the compensatory pricing rule is not unduly burdensome on the innovator because compen-
satory prices are determined on the basis of current unit costs. These costs include any capital costs
that are attributable to the provision of capital equipment; if the capital equipment used to produce
the old components is also used to produce the new system, it may be more scarce and congested than
prior to the innovation. If so, the compensatory price increases. Also, to assure that capital costs for
the production of the old component will be covered, the innovator may require a long-term purchase
agreement.
95. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Corp., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1093 (1980); United States v. IBM, No. 69-200 (S.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 12, 1969) (Complaint at
20-21); ILC Periperals Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 458 F. Supp. 423, 436 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd sub
nom. Memorex Corp. v. IBM, 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980). See generally Note, Berkey Photo,
Inc., v. Eastman Kodak Co.: The Predisclosure Requirement-A New Remedy for Predatory Mar-
keting of Product Innovations, 10 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 395 (1979).
96. See U.S. v. IBM, No. 69-200 (S.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 12, 1969)(Complaint at 20-21).
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the actual introduction of the new product. 7
This disparity of views as to the proper timing of announcements portends the
difficulty of developing workable tests for the legality of product announcements.
Under the standard proposed in this article, the trier of fact would have to deter-
mine whether the timing of the announcement would have been different had the
innovator assumed the continued viability of the rival.
Although several considerations determine the timing of a product announce-
ment, one possibly anticompetitive consideration is the negative effect that a pre-
announcement can have on the revenues of a rival. If, as a result of an early
announcement, prospective buyers postpone their purchases until the new model
becomes commercially available, rivals may experience substantial reductions in
their cash flows, and their viability may be endangered. Moreover, if the innova-
tor anticipates that a rival may exit, a product announcement may be advanced
for several reasons. If the rival exits before the new product is introduced, some
sales are diverted to the preexisting products of the innovator that compete with
the rival. To some extent, this gain offsets the loss of sales to consumers who
react to the preannouncement of the new product by postponing their purchases.
Second, the incremental profit on the new product is increased by the early exit of
rivals because some of their sales are diverted to the new offering. Hence, the
anticipated exit of rivals may increase the benefits and reduce the costs of early
preannouncement, and to this extent, exit inducement may be a motive for early
preannouncement.
On the other hand, early preannouncement of an innovation may be procompe-
titive. If the new product is part of a system, the innovator may wish to provide
other firms with the lead time necessary to the production of complementary com-
ponents. Moreover, even under the continued viability premise, it may be profita-
ble to inform consumers of a forthcoming innovation to encourage them to post-
pone their purchases. Accurate information of this kind can benefit consumers by
promoting better planning and decisionmaking.
Other legitimate considerations, however, justify delay in the timing of a prod-
uct announcement. Because an innovator requires a temporary "quasi-monopoly"
on new products to recoup the costs of R&D, preannouficement may deprive him
of the necessary lead time over his competitors. Thus, to require preannounce-
ments may repress socially beneficial innovation.
We conclude, therefore, that any timing of a product preannouncement should
be presumed legal. The diversity of considerations that underlie the decision to
predisclose the new product make it impossible to fashion an implementable test
for anticompetitive product preannouncements. Furthermore, the need for such a
test is substantially reduced by a requirement that innovating firms provide their
rivals with complementary components at compensatory prices.
97. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Corp., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1093 (1980); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 458 F. Supp. 423, 436 (N.D. Cal. 1978),
atfd sub noma. Memorex Corp. v. IBM, 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980).
